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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Imagine a hypothetical situation in which a truly innocent, yet 
seemingly guilty, debtor, whose unwitting complicity in the delivery of 
testimony or documents in her bankruptcy case leads to her wrongful 
conviction and imprisonment in a separate criminal matter due to 
her ignorance of the existence of her constitutional right to the 
privilege and her inability to assert it effectively. 
She is among the increasing number of pro se debtors in 
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bankruptcy.1  She does not know she is putting herself at risk to be 
arrested and convicted because she, like most debtors in bankruptcy, 
is unaware of much of the criminal law, even though criminal law 
presumes that she has knowledge.2  Before examining more closely 
the concepts of invocation, waiver, and the consequences associated 
with each, consider the hypothetical plight of Sophie Debtor, a truly 
innocent pro se debtor whose testimony would be incriminating.3 
Sophie Debtor lives in Hard Luck Town.4  She is a working mom 
who is separated from her husband, Hank.  She lost her job and filed 
Chapter 7 pro se using forms on the court’s website.  She will appear 
before a trustee at a 341 meeting in thirty days to be examined under 
oath about her finances, including transfers to others5 and cash 
advances.6  She may be asked to turn over documents.7  Sophie is 
 
 1  Joseph Callanan, Pro Se Bankruptcy Filings Growing Faster than Other Debtor Relief, 
LITIGATION NEWS, Dec. 29, 2011, available at 
http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/litigationnews/top_stories 
/010312-pro-se-bankruptcy-growing.html (last visited May 20, 2013)  See infra Part 
II.A and note 79 for the amounts by which pro se filings increased.  While other 
parties in bankruptcy such as creditors, trustees, and witnesses also enjoy the 
privilege, the scope of this article is limited to the individual chapter 7 debtor.  
Chapter 7 bankruptcies account for a majority of all bankruptcies, with over a million 
cases filed in the calendar year ending Sept. 30, 2011.  See U.S. Bankruptcy Courts, 
Business and Nonbusiness Cases Commenced, by Chapter of the Bankruptcy Code, During the 
12-Month Period Ending Sept. 30, 2011, http://www.uscourts.gov
/uscourts/Statistics/BankruptcyStatistics/BankruptcyFilings/2011/0911_f2.pdf (last 
visited Aug. 16, 2013). 
 2  See Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. State of Minn., 218 U.S. 57, 68 (1910). 
 3  This paper does not assess the impact the interrogation of terrorism suspects.  
The loss of their Miranda rights is covered by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Act.  See 50 U.S.C. § 1801 et seq. (2012). 
 4  Song title used by the Blue-Eyed Devils, J.J. Muggler, and the Killer Dwarfs.  
 5  See 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B)(i) (2012) (“The trustee may avoid any 
transfer . . . that was made or incurred within 2 years before the date of the filing of 
the petition, if the debtor . . . received less than a reasonably equivalent value in 
exchange for such transfer or . . . and was insolvent on the date that such transfer was 
made . . . .”). 
 6  See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(C)(i)(I) (2012) (“[C]onsumer debts owed to a 
single creditor and aggregating more than $650 for luxury goods . . . incurred by an 
individual debtor on or within 90 days before the order for relief under this title are 
presumed to be nondischargeable.”); 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(C)(i)(II) (2012) 
(“[C]ash advances aggregating more than $925 that are extensions of consumer 
credit under an open end credit plan obtained by an individual debtor on or within 
70 days before the order for relief under this title, are presumed to be 
nondischargeable . . . .”); Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286 (1991) (holding that 
the burden of proof in 523(a) cases is a preponderance of the evidence). 
 7  11 U.S.C. § 542(e) (2012).  But see In re Fuller, 262 U.S. 91, 93 (1923) (stating 
when a debtor loses control of documents, the privilege against self-incrimination 
does not apply). 
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legally entitled to claim her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination.8  However, its existence was not disclosed in the forms 
she prepared, and she will not be told about it.  She imagines she 
must do whatever the trustee says to get a discharge, including 
appearing and testifying at the meeting of creditors. 
The background that gives rise to the incriminating facts is that 
Sophie’s husband, Hank, is authorized on Sophie’s credit card.  
While Hank was having an affair with Corrie Delecti, he gave money 
to Corrie from cash advances on Sophie’s credit card.  Hank also 
bought Corrie jewelry using Sophie’s credit card.  The transactions 
occurred before Sophie filed bankruptcy and without her knowledge 
or consent.  The bill arrives after Sophie files bankruptcy so the 
transactions are not listed in the filing.  When confronted, Hank 
confesses to the affair and the credit card charges.  He tells Sophie 
that the money and jewelry are in Corrie’s apartment.  Then, he 
leaves. 
Corrie Delecti is murdered and Sophie realizes that she was in 
Corrie’s apartment building at the time of Corrie’s death.  Sophie 
had dropped by to see a friend who was not at home.  Sophie’s friend 
lives across the hall from Corrie’s apartment.  Corrie was the 
neighbor who told Sophie that her friend was out.  An eyewitness saw 
Sophie in the hall outside Corrie’s apartment near the time of the 
murder, but neither the police nor Sophie know this.  The witness 
left that night and returned home to a rural area in another state 
away from the media coverage attendant to the murder. 
The Hard Luck Town forensics team finds no evidence to link 
anyone specifically to the crime.  Sophie has no way to establish her 
innocence.  She has a conviction six years ago for assaulting a woman 
who flirted with Hank in a bar.9  She is truly innocent, but she is at 
risk to be indicted, tried, and wrongfully convicted because of her 
criminal record and her presence at the scene of the crime with the 
 
 8  11 U.S.C. § 542(e) (2012) (“[S]ubject to any applicable privilege, the court may 
order an attorney, accountant, or other person that holds recorded information . . . 
to turn over or disclose such recorded information to the trustee.”) (emphasis 
added); see McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 40 (1922) (stating that the privilege 
against self-incrimination applies equally to criminal and civil bankruptcy 
proceedings); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 562 (1892) (stating that the 
privilege against self-incrimination is not limited to criminal cases). 
 9  Sophie’s prior conviction may or may not be admissible.  See FED. R. EVID. 404  
(“Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a person’s 
character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in 
accordance with the character.”).   
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means, motive, and opportunity.10  Additionally, unless she learns of 
the privilege,11 asserts it unambiguously, and insists on immunity, a 
court is likely to deny her discharge in bankruptcy.12 
At the time of questioning, she is not a suspect in a capital crime, 
but she is aware that her own testimony could lead to her arrest and 
conviction.13  It is ironic that although Sophie will not be told of the 
privilege, she will be informed of credit counseling requirements, the 
available chapters of the bankruptcy code, bankruptcy crimes and 
penalties, the availability of the papers she files for inspection by the 
Department of Justice (DOJ), and the risk of dismissal if she fails to 
file her financial information on time.14  If Sophie is not cooperative, 
the trustee will object to discharge and may request immunity to 
compel her testimony. 
In sum, media reports reveal to Sophie that her responses will 
place her at the scene of the horrific crime with means, motive, 
opportunity, and no alibi.  The circumstantial evidence is strong 
enough to arrest, indict, and possibly convict her.  Sophie knows that 
a person unknown to her has murdered her husband’s mistress only 
minutes after Sophie was in the hallway of the victim’s apartment 
building to drop in on a friend who was not at home. 
She does not know whether the police forensics team has been 
 
 10  For purposes of indictment, prosecutors are not required to present 
exculpatory evidence to the grand jury and defense counsel may not be allowed to 
present their own evidence.  See United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 52 (1992). 
 11  At the outset the Author wishes to clarify the term privilege.  The use of the 
term “privilege,” and all related terms, pertains to the privilege against self-
incrimination unless otherwise indicated. 
 12  For purposes of this article, “invocation” and “proper assertion” will be used 
interchangeably.  A proper assertion is distinguishable from an ordinary assertion in 
that a proper assertion must be unambiguous.  Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 
386–89 (2010); see 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(12) (2012) (global objection to discharge 
related to § 522(q)(1)(A) which applies when debtor has been convicted of a felony 
which, under the circumstances, demonstrates that the filing of the case was an abuse 
of the provisions of this title); 11 U.S.C. § 522(q)(1)(B)(iv) (2012) (“[T]he debtor 
owes a debt arising from any criminal act . . . that caused serious physical injury or 
death to another individual in the preceding 5 years.”); see also 18 U.S.C. § 
3156(a)(3) (2012) (defining a felony as an offense punishable by a maximum term 
of imprisonment of greater than one year). 
 13  Ohio v. Reiner, 532 U.S. 17, 21 (2001) (stating that a person may assert the 
privilege at trial despite her claim of innocence when she has “reasonable cause to 
apprehend danger from her answers”). 
 14  11 U.S.C. § 342(b) (2012) (requiring clerks to furnish all debtors with Official 
Form B201A (notices to consumer debtors)); see also 11 U.S.C. § 527(a)(1) (2012) 
(requiring debt relief agents to provide Official Form B201A to “assisted persons”).  
For a definition of “assisted persons,” see 11 U.S.C. § 101(3) (2012) (defining an 
assisted person as a debtor with less than $186,825 in non-exempt assets). 
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able to find any evidence to further the investigation, or whether 
there are any leads.  She has no prior experience or training in 
investigatory work; however, she is intelligent enough to know that 
any attempts on her part to solve the case could implicate her 
further.  Sophie is truly innocent but at risk of being indicted, tried, 
and wrongfully convicted while having her bankruptcy blocked 
because she is unaware of her Fifth Amendment right to the privilege 
against self-incrimination and how to properly assert it to protect 
herself.15 
If she were aware of the privilege, she would invoke the 
privilege, because there is evidence to link her to commission of the 
crime.  If she were represented and shared her fear of incrimination 
with her attorney, in all likelihood she would be advised to invoke the 
privilege because her responses will be incriminating.  Because she is 
pro se, she is far more likely to respond to the questioning, despite 
knowledge that her responses will be incriminating. 
If she were competently represented, her attorney would advise 
her that her failure to unambiguously invoke her privilege would 
result in the loss of the privilege.  The plight of the debtor is that she 
has few choices.  She must testify under oath and incriminate herself 
in a way that may lead to her arrest and wrongful conviction, or assert 
her privilege.  Her only other choice would be to perjure herself.  If 
she were represented, her attorney would advise her that, if she 
testifies, she must speak truthfully even if her testimony is 
incriminatory, and that perjury is not an option.16  Thus, she logically 
would not speak and unknowingly waive her privilege because she 
would know its importance.17  Likewise, she would redact 
 
 15  See 11 U.S.C. § 522(q)(1) (2012); 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(12) (2012). 
 16  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L. CONDUCT R. 1.2(d), 3.3, 4.1, 8.4; 18 U.S.C. § 1622 
(1994) (2006). But see MODEL RULES OF PROF’L. CONDUCT R. 1.6 Comment (Discussion 
Draft 1983): 
[A] disclosure adverse to the client’s interest should be no greater than 
the lawyer reasonably believes necessary to accomplish the purpose.  
If . . . in . . . a judicial proceeding, the disclosure should be made in a 
manner that limits access to the information to the tribunal or other 
persons having a need to know it and appropriate protective orders or 
other arrangements should be sought by the lawyer to the fullest extent 
practicable. 
 17  A debtor’s silence in this instance could be used against her in a subsequent 
criminal trial.  See Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2181–82 (2013).  Sophie’s failure 
to say, “But I didn’t kill her!” at the first meeting of the creditors is admissible unless 
she invokes the privilege because she cannot rely on Miranda warnings that were 
never given.  See id.  See also Michael J. Hunter, The Man on the Stairs Who Wasn’t There: 
What Does A Defendant’s Pre-Arrest Silence Have to Do with Miranda, the Fifth Amendment, 
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incriminating information from any required schedules.18 
The Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination 
applies to debtors in bankruptcy.19  Despite the seeming protection of 
the Bankruptcy Code,20 the debtor may unwittingly waive her rights 
and incriminate herself by failing to invoke the privilege.21  The pro 
se debtor and the debtor with representation each need notice of the 
constitutional protection so that they are aware of the consequences 
of both invocation and waiver of the privilege.  The possibility of a 
debtor’s failure to properly invoke the privilege is made more 
probable because there is no requirement that debtors be told about 
the privilege prior to filing or interrogation.22 
A debtor may lose the privilege based on a waiver inferred from 
her course of conduct or prior statements concerning a matter,23 
whether or not the waiver is knowing and intelligent.24  This may be 
true even when counsel fails to advise the debtor to refuse to answer, 
25 and the debtor is unaware at the time that the statements may be 
incriminating.26  Once the debtor testifies, she may have waived the 
 
or Due Process?, 28 HAMLINE L. REV. 277, 308 (2005); Andrew J. M. Bentz, The Original 
Public Meaning of the Fifth Amendment and Pre-Miranda Silence, 98 VA. L. REV. 897, 933 
(2012) (arguing that an originalist view of the Fifth Amendment prohibits the 
substantive use of pre-Miranda silence). 
 18  Appendix A shows a mock transcript of the first meeting of creditors and 
reveals the colloquy between Sophie and the trustee.  Contrast Appendix A with 
Appendix B where Sophie (or her attorney) has been made aware of the privilege 
and asserts it unambiguously.  See, e.g., In re Kanter, 117 F. 356, 357 (S.D.N.Y. 1902); 
Ensign v. Pennsylvania, 227 U.S. 592, 599 (1913); Czarlinsky v. United States, 54 F.2d 
889, 893 (10th Cir. 1931), cert. denied, 285 U.S. 549 (1932); In re U.S. Hoffman Can 
Corp., 373 F.2d 622, 629 (3d Cir. 1967). 
 19  See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 542(e) (2006); FED. R. BANKR. 9017 (making the Federal 
Rules of Evidence applicable in bankruptcy including FED. R. CIV. P. 43, 44 and 44.1); 
FED. R. EVID. 501 (stating that, except as required by the Constitution, federal statute, 
or rules of the Court, the privilege of a person is governed by the principles of the 
common law as interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of reason 
and experience; however, in civil litigation where State law supplies the rule of 
decision, the privilege is determined in accordance with State law). 
 20  11 U.S.C. § 542(e) (2006). 
 21  Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 371 (1951) (citing United States v. 
Murdock, 284 U.S. 141, 148 (1931), overruled on other grounds Murphy v. Waterfront 
Comm’n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52 (1983)). 
 22  Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 654 n.9 (1976) (holding that a knowing 
and intelligent waiver is not required in a noncustodial setting). 
 23  In re Litton, 74 B.R. 557, 560 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1987). 
 24  In re Donald Sheldon & Co., 193 B.R. 152, 162 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996) (citing 
Klein v. Harris, 667 F.2d 274, 287 (2d Cir. 1981)). 
 25  In re A&L Oil Co., 200 B.R. 21, 27 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1996). 
 26  See In re Cotillion Invs., Inc., 343 B.R. 344, 351–52 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2006). 
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privilege for later proceedings as to all matters within the scope of 
her testimony. 27 
Without any requirement of notice, the exclusionary rule does 
not apply in civil proceedings.28  In short, the privilege must be 
invoked through its unambiguous assertion in bankruptcy, or it is 
lost.29  This poses special dangers and challenges for pro se debtors, 
who comprise an increasing percentage of total consumer filings and 
who are particularly at risk because of the complexity of the 
proceedings and the exposure to criminal liability.30  The debtor who 
is represented is also placed at risk to the extent she may not be 
properly advised.31 
To secure the just determination of every case32 and protect the 
debtor’s privilege, the Supreme Court, under its rulemaking 
authority,33 should adopt a revised Official Form B201A34 for use in 
consumer bankruptcy cases.  The revised form would provide pre-
filing notice in writing of the privilege against self-incrimination.  To 
accomplish this, the Judicial Conference of the United States should 
promulgate the proposed form pursuant to its rulemaking authority.35  
This simple change would serve to make the debtor aware of the 
privilege prior to filing and the consequences of invocation and 
waiver, so that the privilege would not be lost through ignorance, 
inadvertence, or lack of competent counsel.  This comports with the 
 
 27  See Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 428 (1983). 
 28  See I.N.S. v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1051 (1984). 
 29  It is important in this context to distinguish between violations of the 
“privilege” and violations of the “right” against self-incrimination.  The evidentiary 
privilege is violated when it is properly invoked, yet disclosure of incriminating 
information is compelled in a setting in which no criminal penalties may attach.  The 
constitutional right against self-incrimination is violated when privileged information 
is unprotected whether through non-disclosure or suppression in a setting that 
subjects the person to the threat of imprisonment or other criminal penalties.  See 
21A AM. JUR. 2D Criminal Law § 1036 (1965). 
 30  Filing for Bankruptcy Without an Attorney, U.S. Administrative Office of the 
Courts, BANKRUPTCY RESOURCES, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts
/Bankruptcy/BankruptcyResources/FilingBankruptcyWithoutAttorney.aspx (last 
visited Aug. 16, 2013). 
 31  See supra note 9; see also In re Cotillion Invs., Inc., 343 B.R. 344 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 
2006). 
 32  FED. R. BANKR. P. 1001 (2012). 
 33  28 U.S.C. § 2075 (2006); U.S. CONST. Art. III, § 1 
 34  11 U.S.C. § 342(b) (2006); see Official Form B201A available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/BK_Forms_Current/B_
201A.pdf (providing notice of certain statutorily required information); see also infra 
Part IV.A.1. 
 35  FED. R. BANKR. P. 9009 (2012). 
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federal requirement of disclosure of the privilege in other civil 
actions.36  Although the existing notices in Official Form B201A are 
present because they are required by statutory authority to be given 
to the debtor,37 the Court may still act under the inherent power of its 
rulemaking authority to give notice of the privilege against self-
incrimination.38 
The debtor in bankruptcy should receive written notice of the 
privilege against self-incrimination and acknowledge reading it prior 
to filing, for only through the pre-filing delivery of notice will the 
debtor’s right to the privilege be meaningful. This Article has four 
parts. Part I analyzes the scope and application of the privilege and 
distinguishes the privilege in bankruptcy from its counterpart in the 
custodial setting.  Part II examines the increased risk to the pro se 
debtor and the value of the privilege to the factually innocent and the 
factually guilty who are nonetheless presumptively innocent.  Part III 
explores the plight of the debtor under current law and explains the 
risk of nondisclosure of the privilege.  Finally, Part IV proposes a 
change in the language of Official Form B201A to alleviate the 
 
 36  21 U.S.C. § 844(a) (2006), as implemented through 28 C.F.R. §§ 76.4, 76.6, & 
76.9.  The logical inference is that if Congress and the President through enabling 
legislation and administrative policy can provide notice of a constitutional privilege 
in a civil proceeding, the Court may do no less.  For articles on the inherent 
rulemaking authority of courts see James R. Wolf, Inherent Rulemaking Authority of an 
Independent Judiciary, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 507 (2002); A. Leo Levin & Anthony G. 
Amsterdam, Legislative Control Over Judicial Rule-Making: A Problem in Constitutional 
Revision, 107 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1958); Roscoe Pound, Procedure Under Rules of Court in 
New Jersey, 66 HARV. L. REV. 28, 34 (1952); see also United States v. Stringer, 535 F.3d 
929, 934–35 (9th Cir. 2008) (providing that SEC Form 1662 provides notice that such 
voluntary testimony will be provided to U.S. attorneys on a routine basis and may be 
used in civil or criminal proceedings); IRS Form 8300, available at 
http://www.irs.gov/uac 
/Form-8300,-Report-of-Cash-Payments-Over-$10,000-Received-in-a-Trade-or-Business.  
(“[W]e may also provide the records to appropriate state, local, and foreign criminal 
law enforcement and regulatory personnel in the performance of their official 
duties”).  See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 542(e) (2006); FED. R. BANKR. 9017 (making the 
Federal Rules of Evidence applicable in bankruptcy including FED. R. CIV. P. 43, 44 
and 44.1); FED. R. EVID. 501 (stating that, except as required by the Constitution, 
federal statute, or rules of the Court, the privilege of a person is governed by the 
principles of the common law as interpreted by the courts of the United States in the 
light of reason and experience; however, in civil litigation where State law supplies 
the rule of decision, the privilege is determined in accordance with State law). 
 37  11 U.S.C. § 342(b) (2012). 
 38  United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 505 (1983) (“[G]uided by 
considerations of justice,” and in the exercise of supervisory powers, federal courts 
may, within limits, formulate procedural rules not specifically required by the 
Constitution or the Congress); see supra note 20. 
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problems caused by nondisclosure.39 
II.  THE PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION IN BANKRUPTCY 
A.  The Privilege in American Jurisprudence 
The historical origin of the privilege is obscure.40  Under English 
case law, the privilege against self-incrimination was a common law 
privilege.41 As English case law developed, the privilege applied only 
when there appeared some possibility of incrimination as a result of 
being compelled to answer.42  The privilege did not apply to 
bankruptcy proceedings.43 
The first United States Congress and three-fourths of the states 
constitutionalized the privilege in the Fifth Amendment as a part of 
the Bill of Rights in 1791.44  The Court in United States v. Burr 
recognized the privilege and acknowledged that the protection it 
afforded permitted a person to refuse to give a response to a question 
that could lead to incriminating evidence.45  The privilege, when 
properly invoked, protected the suspect, the criminal defendant, and 
the civil litigant from forced compulsion of incriminating evidence.46  
 
 39  See Official Form B201A, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts
/RulesAndPolicies/rules/BK_Forms_Current/B_201A.pdf (providing notice of 
certain statutorily required information); FED. R. BANKR. P. 9009 (2012); 11 U.S.C. § 
342(b) (2012). 
 40  The historical development of the privilege at English common law is outside 
the scope of this article.  Some scholars link the origins of the English common law 
privilege to the constitutional struggles in the latter half of the seventeenth century 
that resulted in the abolition of the courts of Star Chamber and High Commission, 
while others maintain that the true origins of the common law privilege are 
attributable to the work of defense counsel during the rise of adversary criminal 
procedure at the end of the eighteenth century.  See Joseph H. Langbein, The 
Historical Origins of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination at Common Law, 92 MICH. L. 
REV. 1047 (1994). 
 41  McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 41 (1924) (citing Ex Parte Cossens, 1 Buck 
531, 540 (1820)). 
 42  Regina v. Boyes, 1 Best & S. 311 (1861, Q.B.).  For a discussion of the 
historical development of the privilege in England, see LAFAVE, ISRAEL, KING & KERR, 
Criminal Procedure § 2.10(c) (3d ed. 2007). 
 43  Re Smith, 2 Deac. & Chit. 230 (1833); McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 41 
(1924) (citing Ex Parte Cossens, 1 Buck 531, 540 (1820)). 
 44  U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 45  25 F.Cas. 38, 41 (C.C.D. Va.1807), (holding that the reach of the Fifth 
Amendment was so broad as to make the privilege applicable when there was a mere 
possibility of a criminal charge being made). 
 46  Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 562–63 (1892) (holding that the 
privilege protects a person called to testify before a grand jury, even though that 
person is not the accused, since grand jury is part of a “criminal case”), overruled in 
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It also protected persons in criminal and civil proceedings by 
requiring a grant of immunity as a predicate for the surrender of the 
privilege.47  Although some states had bankruptcy laws, Congress did 
not exercise its power48 to enact a permanent bankruptcy system49 
until 1898.50 
The Bankruptcy Act of July 1, 1898, or “the Act”, required the 
debtor to testify but provided for a limited form of immunity,51 
preventing the use of incriminating testimony, except in a hearing on 
objections to discharge.52  The immunity did not protect documents 
that may have been produced,53 perjury and false oaths,54 or the fruits 
of the debtor’s testimony.55  Because the immunity provided was not 
coextensive with the privilege granted by Counselman v. Hitchcock,56 
the Court held that a debtor could not be forced to give 
incriminating testimony.57 
B.  The Privilege in the Modern Era 
By the early twentieth century, American case law had developed 
to hold that the privilege against self-incrimination applied in 
bankruptcy proceedings.58  Eventually, the Act was amended to 
 
part Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972).  The reasoning, or dicta, in 
Counselman extended the privilege to other judicial proceedings even if not part of a 
“criminal case.” 
 47  Counselman, 142 U.S. at 562–63. 
 48  U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
 49  Earlier Acts lasted only briefly. See, e.g., Bankruptcy Act of 1800, ch. 19, 2 Stat. 
19, repealed by Act of Dec. 19, 1803, ch. 6, 2 Stat. 248; Bankruptcy Act of 1841, ch. 9, 5 
Stat. 440, repealed by Act of March. 3, 1843, ch. 82, 5 Stat. 614; Bankruptcy Act of 1867, 
ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517, amended by Act of June 22, 1874, ch. 390, 18 Stat. 178, repealed by 
Act of June 7, 1878, ch. 170, 20 Stat. 99. 
 50  The Bankruptcy Act of July 1, 1898, c. 541, 30 Stat. 544, as amended, 
sometimes called the Nelson Act, repealed by Pub. L. No. 95-598. 
 51  Id. at 11 U.S.C. § 7a(10) (repealed 1878). 
 52  Ensign v. Com. of Pa., 227 U.S. 592, 599 (1913). 
 53  In re Fuller, 262 U.S. 91, 93–94 (1923). 
 54  Edelstein v. United States, 149 F. 636, 646 (8th Cir. 1906), cert. denied, 205 U.S. 
543 (1907). 
 55  COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, § 3-344 (16th ed. 2012). 
 56 See 142 U.S. 547, 585–86 (1892) (reasoning that no statute that leaves the party 
or witness subject to prosecution after he answers the incriminating question can 
supplant the privilege and holding that to be valid, a statute must afford absolute 
immunity against future prosecution for the offense to which the question relates). 
 57  In re Nachman, 114 F. 995, 997 (D.S.C. 1902). 
 58  McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 40 (1924); In re Rosser, 96 F. 305, 308 (E.D. 
Mo. 1899); see also Craig Peyton Gaumer & Charles L. Nail, Jr., Truth of Consequences: 
The Dilemma of Asserting the Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in 
Bankruptcy Proceedings, 76 NEB. L. REV. 497, 501 (1997). 
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provide that immunity not only applied to testimony, but to evidence 
“directly or indirectly derived from such testimony . . . .”59  The Court 
developed a standard requiring that the privilege protect an 
individual when she reasonably believes a disclosure could be used in 
a criminal prosecution.60  The application and scope of the privilege 
in the various aspects of the bankruptcy process will be more closely 
examined in Part III.61 
The debtor in bankruptcy, like persons in other civil 
proceedings, does not enjoy the same protections afforded by the 
privilege to those in criminal proceedings.62  Nevertheless, if the 
debtor is interrogated about matters that could prove incriminating, 
she may invoke the privilege against self-incrimination63 and insist on 
immunity before answering.64 
C.  The Privilege in Varying Contexts 
The differences between the privilege in the custodial or 
criminal setting and the bankruptcy setting create special challenges 
for debtors, clearly shown by examining the procedural safeguards 
afforded a person in a custodial or criminal setting.65  The Court in 
the custodial setting seeks to ensure that any waiver of the privilege 
be knowing and intelligent by requiring that Miranda rights be 
given.66  If the Miranda rights are not given, a presumption of 
 
 59  Pub. L. No. 91-452, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970); 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (2012) 
(codifying § 207 of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970); see United States v. 
Goodwin, 470 F.2d 893 (5th Cir. 1972) (upholding conviction despite Defendant’s 
argument that § 7a(10) prior to the amendment was unconstitutional, and holding 
that Congress had power to grant restricted immunity to witnesses who fail to invoke 
the privilege). 
 60  Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 444–45 (1972). 
 61  See infra Part III.   
 62  See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (stating that an 
individual under custodial interrogation is entitled to warning (notice) of her right 
to remain silent or end questioning and her right to an attorney); see also Laurent 
Sacharoff, Miranda’s Hidden Right, 63 ALA. L. REV. 535 (2012). 
 63  See supra note 12. 
 64  11 U.S.C. § 344 (2006). 
 65  The use of the terms “custodial” and “criminal” will be used interchangeably 
for purposes of the Article.  
 66  See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444 (1966) (stating that interrogation is custodial if it 
occurs while the individual is “in custody at the [police] station or otherwise deprived of 
his freedoms of action in any significant way”) (emphasis added).  If the interrogation is 
custodial: 
[h]e must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to 
remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court 
of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if 
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compulsion arises that may lead to the suppression of any evidence 
obtained under the exclusionary rule.67 
The Court has held that a person in the criminal context, who is 
subject to custodial interrogation, must be told of her rights against 
self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment before she can waive 
those rights.68  The burden is on the state to establish the 
voluntariness of the waiver.69  Although the debtor is required to 
appear at various times throughout the bankruptcy process, and is 
subject to questioning,70 she is not entitled to Miranda warnings at any 
time during the proceedings.71  For this reason, the debtor may be 
unaware when she files her bankruptcy petition and schedules, or 
when she testifies at any point in the bankruptcy proceedings, that 
she is potentially opening herself up to criminal liability through 
waiver of the privilege. 
 
he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to 
any questioning if he so desires. 
Id. at 479. 
 67  Miranda, 384 U.S. at 460–65. 
 68  See id. at 444. 
 69  Id.  Waiver of the privilege appears in a variety of contexts requiring the 
court’s judgment.  Compare Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 468 (1981) (“A criminal 
defendant, who neither initiates a psychiatric evaluation nor attempts to introduce 
any psychiatric evidence, may not be compelled to respond to a psychiatrist if his 
statements can be used against him at a capital sentencing proceeding.”), with 
Noggle v. Marshall, 706 F.2d 1408, 1417 (6th Cir. 1983) (holding that the Fifth 
Amendment was still relevant as to a psychiatrist called by the defense but it did not 
warrant habeas relief). 
 70  11 U.S.C. § 341(d) (2006) (“[T]he trustee shall orally examine the 
debtor . . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 71  See United States v. Jackson, 836 F.2d 324, 327 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that a 
debtor who was “convicted of giving false oaths at bankruptcy proceedings and 
concealing creditor’s collateral” was not entitled to Miranda warnings during the 
bankruptcy proceedings).  Furthermore, other courts have held that a person is not 
“in custody” for Miranda purposes merely because of his compelled appearance at a 
judicial proceeding to give testimony.  See, e.g., United States v. Melendez, 228 F.3d 
19, 22 (1st Cir. 2000) (hearing on motion to dismiss criminal charges of another 
person); United States v. Byram, 145 F.3d 405, 410 (1st Cir. 1998) (criminal trial of 
another); United States v. Kilgroe, 959 F.2d 802, 804–05 (9th Cir. 1992) (criminal 
trial of another); United States v. Vecchiarello, 569 F.2d 656, 664–65 (D.C. Cir. 1977) 
(depositions); Unites States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 92 (D.C. Cir. 1976) 
(interrogation by the House Judiciary Committee); United States v. Pommerening, 
500 F.2d 92, 99–100 (10th Cir. 1974) (grand jury witnesses); State v. Cathey, 741 P.2d 
738, 743 (Kan. 1987) (inquisition hearing) overruled on other grounds by State v. 
Schoonover, 133 P.3d 48, 78 (Kan. 2006); State v. Tonzola, 621 A.2d 243, 247 (Vt. 
1993) (“inquest” procedure to investigate crime). 
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D.  The Privilege in Bankruptcy Proceedings 
In the early years of the republic, the Fifth Amendment right 
against self-incrimination was held to exist whenever there was the 
mere possibility of incrimination.72  The literal wording of the 
constitutional provision states: “No person . . . shall be compelled in 
any criminal case to be a witness against himself. . . .”73  Prior to 
Miranda, there was no obligation to advise a person in either the 
criminal or civil setting; the privilege, once invoked, was equally 
protective in both.74 
However, today the invoked privilege against self-incrimination 
in bankruptcy is not the equal of its custodial counterpart.75  With the 
passage of time, the privilege in the criminal setting has evolved into 
a more robust right, requiring a “knowing and intelligent” waiver.76  
Miranda strengthened the presumption of compulsion on failure to 
warn and the application of the exclusionary rule.77  In contrast, its 
civil counterpart has atrophied to the point that a knowing and 
intelligent waiver is not required, but rather, may be inferred from 
prior unwarned conduct or testimony.78 
E.  Types of Immunity 
Immunity is a term of art in the law, with many nuanced 
meanings dependent on context.79  The types of immunity that are 
relevant in this context are transactional immunity, use immunity, 
and derivative use immunity.  Immunity acts like a dam, holding back 
compelled testimonial information from use in a criminal 
 
 72  United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 38, 41 (C.C.D. Va. 1807). 
 73  U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added). 
 74  The pre-Miranda privilege was “equally protective” in the civil and criminal 
settings in that (1) notice was not required prior to interrogation, (2) transactional 
immunity was required in either context to compel testimony, and (3) no adverse 
inference could be drawn from silence.  See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 
452–53 (1972).  The privilege would be eroded further in 1976 when Baxter v. 
Palmiagiano allowed an adverse inference to be drawn from silence in civil cases.  See 
425 U.S. 308, 318 (1976). 
 75  Piccirillo v. New York, 400 U.S. 548, 567 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 76  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966). 
 77  See id. at 462. 
 78  In re Donald Sheldon & Co., 193 B.R. 152, 162 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996) (citing 
Klein v. Harris, 667 F.2d 274, 287 (2d Cir. 1981)); In re Litton, 74 B.R. 557, 560 
(Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1987). 
 79  Congressional immunity, sovereign immunity, diplomatic immunity, and 
judicial immunity are beyond the scope of this Article.  Though each could touch the 
realm of bankruptcy practice, none lie at the heart of the Author’s thesis. 
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prosecution while allowing the regulated release of that same privileged 
information in other settings.  Historically, immunity is the price the 
sovereign must pay for forfeiture of the privilege. 
1. Transactional Immunity 
 As the term implies, transactional immunity is a grant of 
immunity that shields the witness from any exposure to criminal 
liability related to a particular transaction.80  In other words, the 
witness, having been given transactional immunity and compelled to 
testify, cannot thereafter be charged, prosecuted, convicted, or 
punished for any related matters despite the fact that the witness’s 
guilt could be established without use of the witness’s testimony or 
the fruits of that testimony.  Thus, the price paid for the forfeiture of 
the privilege is the sovereign’s guarantee that the witness is protected 
from exposure to criminal liability regarding the particular 
transaction.  For that reason, the witness’s constitutional right to the 
privilege is not violated, because the immunity removes the potential 
criminality and renders testimony that would otherwise be 
incriminating innocuous in a criminal context.81 
2. Use Immunity 
Use immunity is more limited than transactional immunity in 
that the witness is protected only from the “use” of the witness’ 
testimony in any criminal proceeding against the witness.  In other 
words, if the state has sufficient evidence apart from the testimony 
compelled of the witness following the grant of immunity, the witness 
may be tried with that evidence.  The burden is on the state to 
establish that the evidence adduced does not use the quarantined 
testimony.82  To the extent that use immunity rather than 
transactional immunity will suffice as the state’s “payment” to 
eliminate the debtor’s privilege, the value of the privilege is reduced 
because of the degree to which protection from criminal prosecution 
is lost.83 
 
 80  Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 586 (1892), overruled by Kastigar v. 
United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972). 
 81  Id. 
 82  Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 103 (1964), 
abrogated by United States v. Balsys, 542 U.S. 666 (2007). 
 83  Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 466–67 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“When we allow the 
prosecution to offer only ‘use’ immunity we allow it to grant far less than it has taken 
away.  For while the precise testimony that is compelled may not be used, leads from 
that testimony may be pursued and used to convict the witness.”). 
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3. Derivative Use Immunity 
Closely related to use immunity is derivative use immunity.  
Derivative use immunity denies the state the use of evidence that is 
derived from the witness’ testimony.  Thus, not only is the actual 
testimony immune, but also the “fruits” of the immunized testimony 
are forbidden fruits that may not be used in a criminal proceeding 
against the witness.84 
F.  Two Privileges from One Right 
Over time, the Supreme Court has altered the type of immunity 
necessary to compel testimony in the face of a proper assertion of the 
privilege.  As examined below in Part III.E, the Court, over the course 
of history, has moved from a rule mandating transactional immunity 
in exchange for “immunized testimony” to a rule permitting the 
compulsion of privileged testimony through a grant of use immunity 
and derivative use immunity.85  The implications of the Court’s 
decisions affect debtors, debtors’ counsel, and the courts in 
dramatically different ways. 
Because transactional immunity is no longer required to compel 
testimony over an assertion of the privilege, debtors remain at risk of 
prosecution after the compulsion of testimony.  Instead, the Court 
has held that use and derivative use immunity is sufficient.86  As a 
result, in the words of Justice Brennan, “use immunity literally misses 
half the point of the privilege, for it permits the compulsion without 
removing the criminality.”87  In short, the modern day privilege 
against self-incrimination in the bankruptcy setting is an anemic 
distant cousin of its former self. 
Clearly, two distinct privileges have emerged from one 
 
 84  Murphy, 378 U.S. at 79. 
 85  While the United States Supreme Court has held that use and derivative use 
immunity are sufficient, some state courts still require transactional immunity.  See, 
e.g., Pratt v. Kirkpatrick, 718 P.2d 962 (Alaska 1986); Steinberger v. District Court, In 
and For Tenth Judicial Dist., 596 P.2d 755 (Colo. 1979); State v. Miyasaki, 614 P.2d 
915 (Haw. 1980); People ex rel. Cruz v. Fitzgerald, 363 N.E.2d 835 (Ill. 1977); In re 
Criminal Investigation No. 1-162, 516 A.2d 976 (Md. 1986); Matter of Pressman, 658 
N.E.2d 156 (Mass. 1995); People v. McIntire, 599 N.W.2d 102 (Mich. 1999); State v. 
Charest, 336 N.W.2d 303 (Minn. 1983); Kelly v. Grand Jury of Lewis and Clark Cnty., 
552 P.2d 1399 (Mont. 1976); People v. Chin, 490 N.E.2d 505 (1986); State ex rel. 
Koren v. Grogan, 629 N.E.2d 446 (Ohio 1994); State v. Bertoldi, 495 A.2d 247 (R.I. 
1985); State v. Runions, 665 P.2d 1358 (Wash. 1983); State v. Cottrill, 511 S.E.2d 488 
(W. Va. 1998). 
 86  Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 462. 
 87  Piccirillo v. New York, 400 U.S. 548, 567 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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fundamental constitutional right.  In the criminal setting, notice of 
the privilege must be given; waiver must be voluntary, knowing and 
intelligent; and no adverse inference may be drawn from an 
invocation of the privilege.  In the civil setting, notice need not be 
given; waiver need not be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent; and an 
adverse inference may be drawn.  As important as these differences 
are to judges, attorneys, and academics, it has the greatest impact on 
the civil litigant to whom no explanation is required.  This is 
particularly true of the debtor in chapter 7 bankruptcy proceedings 
for at least three reasons: (1) the debtor’s inability to voluntarily 
dismiss the proceedings;88 (2) the debtor’s forfeiture of ownership of 
books, records, and documents to the trustee as custodian of the 
estate;89 and (3) the inference of waiver of the privilege that arises 
from the filing of statements and schedules with the petition.90 
The pro se debtor and the debtor with representation each need 
notice of the privilege, its scope, and its limitations no less than those 
who are subject to custodial interrogation.91  The constitutional 
protection intended for the benefit of all citizens is at risk when the 
existence of the privilege remains undisclosed.  Without appropriate 
disclosures to the debtor regarding proper invocation, the possibility 
of inferred waiver of the privilege, and the consequences that flow 
from both invocation and waiver, the privilege serves no purpose. 
 
 88  In re Bartee, 317 B.R. 362, 366 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2004) (chapter 7 suit may only 
be dismissed for cause).  Chapter 11 debtors must also establish cause for a dismissal 
of their suit.  11 U.S.C. § 1112 (2012); In re Helmers, 361 B.R. 190 (Bankr. D. Kan. 
2007).  Chapter 12 and 13 debtors are given an absolute right to dismissal by statute, 
but the Eighth Circuit has held that a trustee may convert the case to chapter 7 
(thereby requiring a show of cause) even after the debtor has moved for dismissal.  
11 U.S.C. § 1208(a) (2012); 11 U.S.C. § 1307(a) (2012); In re Graven, 936 F.2d 378, 
387 (8th Cir. 1991); In re Molitor, 76 F.3d 218, 220 (8th Cir. 1996). 
 89  See In re Fuller, 262 U.S. 91, 94 (1923) (holding that where the debtor is 
required to deliver books and papers in the bankruptcy proceedings, she is not 
privileged under the Fifth Amendment). 
 90  See Czarlinsky v. United States, 54 F.2d 889, 893 (10th Cir. 1931), cert. denied, 
285 U.S. 549 (1932). 
 91  The many scenarios under which the need for the privilege may arise are so 
varied that the scope of this Article cannot extend to them all.  See United States v. 
Greer, 631 F.3d 608, 612 (2d Cir. 2011) cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1841 (2011) (holding 
that a tattoo is “testimonial” such that the privilege against self-incrimination could 
apply). 
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III. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE PRIVILEGE 
A.  The Rise of the Pro Se Debtor in Bankruptcy 
Over the last five years, the rate of pro se bankruptcy filings grew 
much faster than the rate of growth of overall bankruptcy filings, 
particularly in the western part of the United States.92  Non-pro se 
bankruptcy petitions rose 98 percent over the last five years, while pro 
se filings grew 187 percent over the same time period.93  Pro se 
chapter 7 (liquidation) filings jumped 208 percent, and pro se 
chapter 13 (reorganization) filings were up 189 percent.94  Between 
2007 and 2011, pro se chapter 7 filings increased from 6 percent to 8 
percent and pro se chapter 13 filings increased from 6 percent to 10 
percent.95 
To give these percentages real meaning, it is worthwhile to 
convert them to raw numbers.  For the period ending in June 2011, 
there were just over one million consumer chapter 7 bankruptcies.96  
The 8 percent figure represents nearly 84,000 pro se chapter 7 
debtors in one year.97  Ten percent of all chapter 13 filings 
constituted nearly 43,000 during that same time period.98  Together, 
the total number of filings by pro se debtors has swollen to over 
125,000 per year.99  Notably, this increase in pro se filings as a 
percentage of all filings occurred during a period when the total 
number of annual bankruptcy filings doubled.100 
The effect of this dramatic increase is not spread evenly around 
the country.101  There appears to be some correlation between pro se 
filings and areas with reduced family income.102  For example, pro se 
 
 92  The Third Branch, By the Numbers—Pro Se Filers in the Bankruptcy Courts, 
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS (2011), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/News/TheThirdBranch/11-10-01 
/By_the_Numbers—Pro_Se_Filers_in_the_Bankruptcy_Courts.aspx. 
 93  Id. 
 94  Id. 
 95  Id. 
 96  The total number was 1,047,131.  Id. 
 97  Id. 
 98  The Third Branch supra note 92. 
 99  Id. 
 100  The total number of bankruptcy filings for the period ending June 2007 was 
751,056, while the total for the period ending June 2011 was 1,529,560. The Third 
Branch, supra note 92. 
 101  Id.  (indicating the percent of bankruptcy cases filed pro se on a map). 
 102  Ronald Brownstein & Scott Bland, The Geography of Pain, THE NAT’L J. 
(updated Sept.30, 2011), available at http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine
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filings in the Central District of California represented 27.1 percent 
of all filings,103 while in the Eastern District of California pro se filings 
were 16.5 percent of all filings.104  In Arizona, pro se filings comprised 
20.8 percent of all filings.105 
B.  Protecting the Innocent 
The factually guilty individual, who must remain presumptively 
innocent, and the factually innocent person, who is only seemingly 
guilty, must both be protected.106  The rights of each must be guarded 
by the attorney-client privilege from the public disclosure of her 
admissions to counsel.107  Regardless of whether she is guilty or 
innocent, her privilege against self-incrimination must be preserved 
through proper invocation, if necessary.108  She must not be subjected 
to interrogation tactics that rob her of her right to remain silent and 
her right to stop the questioning.109  She must remain innocent until 
she decides to waive her rights and enter a voluntary plea, or demand 
a trial at which her peers will weigh whether the state has proven each 
element of any charges beyond a reasonable doubt.110 
 
/census-sheds-new-light-on-toll-of-great-recession-20110929 (last visited Aug. 16, 
2013).  Twenty states saw their median family incomes plummet at least a dizzying 
five percent over those two years (2008–2010).  The largest losses were clustered in 
the twin poles of Sun Belt and Rust Belt states: on the one hand, Arizona, Georgia, 
Florida, Nevada, Alabama, North Carolina, California, and South Carolina; on the 
other, Michigan, Indiana, and Ohio.  Id.  A more diverse list of seventeen other states 
lost between three and five percent of median family income.  Id. 
 103  There were 39,478 pro se filings in the Central District of California out of a 
total of 145,741 consumer filings.  Id. 
 104  There were 8,877 pro se filings compared to 53,888 total consumer filings in 
the Eastern District of California.  The Third Branch, supra note 92 (showing 
percentage grouping of bankruptcy cases filed pro se on a map). 
 105  In Arizona there were 8,625 pro se filings among the 41,377 total consumer 
filings.  Id. 
 106  Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895) (“The principle that there is 
a presumption of innocence in favor of the accused is the undoubted law, axiomatic 
and elementary, and its enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of 
our criminal law.”). 
 107  FED. R. EVID. 501; see 1 JOHN W. STRONG ET AL., MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 386–
445 (6th ed. 2006). 
 108  Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (2010) (citing Davis v. United States, 512 
U.S. 452, 459 (1994)) (holding that a suspect’s Miranda right to remain silent, stop 
questioning, or request counsel must be invoked “unambiguously”). 
 109  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (“[T]he prosecution may not 
use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial 
interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural 
safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination.”). 
 110  U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
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Protection of the rights of the factually guilty in a criminal 
situation is often the easier problem for counsel because the guilty 
often realize they need to exercise every legal right available to 
them.111  Thus, the desire for, and value of, the evidentiary privilege is 
clear and urgent.  The guilty client may seek counsel before there is a 
real threat of arrest or prosecution.  As the book of Proverbs says: 
“The wicked flee when no man pursueth: but the righteous are bold 
as a lion.”112  Fear is a powerful motivator, and those who believe 
themselves to be in violation of the law are more likely to seek to 
protect themselves, whether through concealment, flight, or legal 
counsel.  On the other hand, it is equally true that the righteous or 
innocent are bold.  They are apt to be far less cautious because they 
have no reason to suspect they are being pursued, making them all 
the more vulnerable. 
And so, though it may seem ironic, the truly innocent person is 
on the continuum of those whose rights need protecting.113  This is 
true, not because of what she has done, but because of what someone 
else may have done.  She may fall prey to the wrongdoer who would 
use her as a scapegoat.  Law enforcement and vigilantes may target 
her as a suspect when the true perpetrator is not self-evident.  She 
may be victimized by the ineptitude of investigators who overlook 
some clues and misdiagnose others.  And, to be sure, she may naively 
incriminate herself because of her misplaced confidence in our 
system of justice and her inability to think like a criminal, a 
policeman, a prosecutor, a judge, or a juror.  It is precisely because 
the innocent does not feel guilty that she is most vulnerable.  Unlike 
her guilty counterpart, she feels no need to be guarded in her speech 
or conduct, nor does she sense a need for the protection afforded by 
counsel.  In short, the system ostensibly designed for the protection 
of the innocent offers many opportunities for the forfeiture of her 
rights and liberties.114 
 
 111  This is true when the criminal conduct remains undiscovered and at all points 
in the criminal process. 
 112  Proverbs 28:1 (King James). 
 113  Ohio v. Reiner, 532 U.S. 17, 21 (2001) (stating that a person may assert 
privilege at trial of the accused despite her claim of innocence when she has 
“reasonable cause to apprehend danger from an answer”). 
 114  In 2011 in United States District Courts, dismissals and acquittals totaled 8,197 
in criminal proceedings.  Judicial Business of the United States Courts, ADMINISTRATIVE 
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, available at http://www.uscourts.gov
/uscourts/Statistics/JudicialBusiness/2011/JudicialBusiness2011.pdf 230 (last visited 
Aug. 16, 2013).  In 2010 in federal criminal courts, 7,782 cases were dismissed and 
415 defendants were acquitted.  Dismissals and acquittals (“outcome for a defendant 
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When an innocent person does assert her privilege, another 
danger is the cultural belief that those who assert the privilege must 
in fact be guilty.115  From a modern day perspective, our society may 
decry the injustices that gave rise to the privilege.116  Yet, in a 
collective denial of our own cultural hypocrisy, there is often a 
perception of guilt and an expectation that the accused should be 
compelled to speak and establish her innocence, or by her silence 
admit the truthfulness of the allegations, however damning.117  
 
in a case”) for the five-year period beginning in 2005 totaled 41,709.  Bureau of 
Justice Statistics, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, Federal Criminal Case Processing 
Statistics, available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/fjsrc
/var.cfm?ttype=one_variable&agency=AOUSC&db_type=CrimCtCases&saf=OUT 
(last visited Aug. 16, 2013) (Note: to access the information click the “year” tab, then 
the “outcome” tab to add each year for the total).  One explanation for the number 
of dismissals and acquittals is that, while the suspect originally appeared guilty, 
further investigation revealed her innocence.  It is logical to assume that there is a 
direct relationship between the loss of the privilege and the increased likelihood of 
arrest, prosecution, and conviction because, by definition, the suspect is compelled 
to provide incriminating evidence against herself.  This possibility of innocence is a 
key reason that the debtor must be informed of her privilege against self-
incrimination.  This need for disclosure is manifest in the number of exonerations.  
Infra note 129.  Therefore, if the justice system will inevitably convict the innocent, it 
is logical that the same system would establish innocence even when someone is 
factually guilty. 
 115  Cf. Politifact Florida, Does Rick Scott Invoking the Fifth Amendment Imply Guilt?, 
available at  http://www.politifact.com/florida/statements/2010/oct/12 
/florida-democratic-party/does-rick-scott-invoking-fifth-amendment-imply-gui/ (last 
visited Aug. 16, 2013) (questioning whether Florida governor Rick Scott had implied 
his own guilt by claiming the Fifth Amendment, as he was so accused by a television 
ad). 
 116  LAFAVE, ISRAEL, KING & KERR, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 2.10(c) (3d ed.).  The 
Court in Miranda noted that the privilege originated in the trial of John Lilburn who 
was made to take the Star Chamber Oath in 1637.  The oath would have bound him 
to answer to all questions posed to him on any subject.  He resisted the oath and 
declaimed the proceedings, because he believed that “no man’s conscience ought to 
be racked by oaths imposed, to answer to questions concerning himself in matters 
criminal.”  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 458–59 (1966).  On account of the 
Lilburn Trial, Parliament abolished the inquisitorial Court of Star Chamber.  Id.  The 
Court also illustrated the fact that custodial interrogation (even without brutality) 
takes a heavy toll on individuals in the following examples:  
In Townsend v. Sain, the defendant was a 19-year-old heroin addict, 
described as a ‘near mental defective.’  The defendant in Lynumn v. 
Illinois was a woman who confessed to the arresting officer after being 
importuned to ‘cooperate’ in order to prevent her children from being 
taken by relief authorities.  This Court, as in those cases, reversed the 
conviction of a defendant in Haynes v. Washington, whose persistent 
request during his interrogation was to phone his wife or attorney.   
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 455–56 (citations omitted). 
 117  Ted Sampsell-Jones, Making Defendants Speak, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1327, 1328 
(2009)  (“Courts should adjust the mix by rewarding defendants more for testifying 
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Society’s expectation that the innocent person who is accused should 
speak, arises from the perception that innocence is susceptible to 
proof.  This view prevailed in the courts prior to the adoption of the 
privilege and is premised on the idea that only the guilty would 
remain silent in the face of the threat of criminal punishment.118  This 
perpetuates the “trilemma” of self-accusation, perjury, or contempt 
that the privilege was designed to avoid.119  The accused must testify, 
lie, or face the possibility of contempt or conviction for her silence. 
C.  The Negative Proof Burden 
In a civilized society, most individuals more readily imagine 
being the victim of crime than the perpetrator.120  The thought of 
establishing legal innocence may not seem frightening.  Instead, a 
person may presume that our judicial system will protect her,121 as the 
law goes to great lengths to avoid asking a litigant to prove a negative 
proposition precisely because of the admitted difficulty.122  Statutes of 
limitation and statutes of fraud are examples of society’s desire to 
avoid injustice to defendants in civil and criminal proceedings due to 
concerns about insufficiency of evidence.123 
The law and society acknowledge that proving a negative 
 
and punishing them more for declining to testify.”). 
 118  LAFAVE, ISRAEL, KING & KERR, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 2.10(c) (3d ed.). 
 119  Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 596 (1990) (“At its core, the privilege 
reflects our fierce ‘unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel 
trilemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt.”‘ (quoting Doe v. United States, 
487 U.S. 201, 212 (1988))). 
 120  In this context, a civilized society is one governed by the rule of law and in 
which most people are law-abiding. 
 121  In a recent study, seventy-two participants (first year Psychology students) were 
deemed “guilty or innocent of a mock theft [and] were apprehended for 
investigation.  Motivated to avoid prosecution and trial, they were confronted by a 
neutral, sympathetic, or hostile male ‘detective’ who sought a waiver of their Miranda 
rights.”  Saul M. Kassin & Rebecca J. Norwick, Why People Waive Their Miranda Rights: 
The Power of Innocence, 28 LAW AND HUMAN BEHAVIOR 211 (2004).  “[P]articipants who 
were truly innocent were significantly more likely to sign a waiver than those who 
were guilty.”  Id.  The study concluded that most subjects waived their rights even in a 
hostile detective condition where the risk of interrogation was apparent based on a 
naive belief in the power of their innocence to set them free.  Id. at 212–13. 
 122  The burden of proof is on the civil litigant seeking redress to adduce the 
necessary evidence and affirmatively prove the elements of the cause of action or the 
elements of the crime in a criminal action.  Sadeghi v. INS, 40 F.3d 1139, 1143 (10th 
Cir. 1994); Rockwell v. Comm’r, 512 F.2d 882, 887 (9th Cir. 1975); People v. Orth, 
530 N.E.2d 210, 215 (Ill. 1988); Lublin v. Cent. Islip Psychiatric Ctr., 372 N.E.2d 307, 
310 (N.Y. 1977); Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 218 (1960). 
 123  51 AM. JUR. 2D, Limitation of Actions § 9 (2007); 73 AM. JUR. 2D, Statute of Frauds 
§ 425 (2007). 
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proposition, such as true innocence, may require much more 
evidence than proving an affirmative proposition, such as guilt.124  
The danger is the possibility that the accused is truly innocent, 
coupled with the magnitude of the harm arising from a wrongful 
conviction.125  The privilege protects the truly innocent person whose 
testimony would make her appear guilty.126 
D.  The Factually Guilty 
The value of the privilege is no less important to the debtor who 
is factually guilty than it is to the debtor who is only seemingly guilty.  
The privilege protects the factually guilty person by preserving the 
presumption of innocence and the right to a fair trial.127  The 
presumption of innocence is critical to providing fundamental 
fairness to the accused in a criminal setting.  It is diminished to the 
extent that the accused is compelled to testify through the 
inadvertent loss of the privilege.  Because guilt is a legal conclusion 
that must await the outcome of judicial proceedings, preservation of 
the privilege is essential to protect the factually guilty.  The American 
legal system is founded on an accusatorial basis, not inquisitorial.128 
E.  The Wrongfully Convicted 
The risk of wrongful arrest, prosecution, and conviction is real.  
With modern day forensics, the number of innocent people who have 
been wrongfully convicted is increasingly evident.  As of August 19, 
2013, the Innocence Project has exonerated 311 persons through 
 
 124  See Elkins, 364 U.S. at 218. 
 125  Consider Eddie Joe Lloyd, a mentally handicapped man who falsely confessed 
to the rape and murder of a young woman after police led him to believe that he 
would smoke out the real killer.  See Barry Scheck & Peter Neufeld, 250 Exonerated—
Too Many Wrongfully Convicted, Innocence Project Report, available at 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/docs/InnocenceProject_250.pdf (last visited Aug. 
16, 2013).  See discussion supra at Part II.E.  See also JUSTIN BROOKS, WRONGFUL 
CONVICTIONS 4 (1st ed. 2011). 
 126  Ohio v. Reiner, 532 U.S. 17, 21 (2001) (stating that a person may assert 
privilege at trial of the accused despite her claim of innocence when she has 
“reasonable cause to apprehend danger from an answer”). 
 127  United States v. Impson, 531 F.2d 274, 277 (5th Cir. 1976) (“Silence is the 
right of the innocent as well as of the guilty.”); De Luna v. United States, 308 F.2d 
140, 151 (5th Cir. 1962) (“To make the privilege against self-incrimination effective 
and to preserve the presumption of innocence, almost all of the states adopted laws 
forbidding comment on a defendant’s neglect or refusal to testify and decreeing that 
no inference should be drawn from his silence.”). 
 128  Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 541 (1961). 
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DNA testing in the United States.129  The protection of the innocent is 
inextricably linked to the presumption of innocence and the 
privilege against self-incrimination.  False confessions and 
incriminating statements lead to wrongful conviction in 
approximately 27 percent of cases.130  Nearly 10 percent of exonerees 
pled guilty to crimes they did not commit.131 
Wrongful convictions are more likely to occur when an adverse 
inference is drawn from exercise of the privilege, causing an innocent 
person to appear guilty.  Although jurors may be instructed not to 
consider a defendant’s refusal to testify, in reality, it is difficult for a 
jury instruction to override the temptation to believe that the 
defendant has something to hide.132 
IV.  THE PLIGHT OF THE DEBTOR IN RETAINING THE PRIVILEGE 
The privilege may be lost at any time.  To the extent that the 
debtor is not aware that the privilege may be waived, or how it may be 
waived, the privilege is at risk.  Thus, even a debtor that is aware of 
the privilege may inadvertently waive it.  When facing criminal 
charges, retaining the privilege is as critical as claiming it. 
A.  Invocation of the Privilege 
During the course of the bankruptcy proceedings, a debtor may 
be exposed to various instances in which she may be asked to provide 
incriminating evidence and need to invoke the privilege.  The Code 
requires the debtor to attend a meeting of creditors and be orally 
examined under oath by a trustee.133  The debtor must answer 
 
 129  THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/ (last visited Aug. 
19, 2013). The Innocence Project details each one of the first 250 DNA exoneration 
cases and includes statistics on common causes of the wrongful convictions.  See Barry 
Scheck & Peter Neufeld, 250 Exonerated—Too Many Wrongfully Convicted, Innocence 
Project Report, 1, 51 (2010), available at http://www.innocenceproject.org/docs
/InnocenceProject_250.pdf (last visited Aug. 16, 2013). 
 130  Id. at 32–33. 
 131  Id. 
 132  In 1980, one study concluded that defendants who appeared to withhold 
evidence were judged more harshly, indicating that something (we don’t know what) 
goes on in the mind of the jury.  E. GIL CLARY & DAVID R. SHAFFER, Effects of Evidence 
Withholding and a Defendant’s Prior Record on Juridic Decisions, 112 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 237 
(1980).  Another study concluded, however, that pleading the fifth did not have as 
great an effect on the strength of the conviction meted out by mock jurors as did 
pleading guilty.  SHELLEY M. FISCHER & LAWRENCE A. FEHR, The Effect Of Defendant’s 
Plea On Mock Juror Decisions, 125 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 531, 531–33 (1985). 
 133  11 U.S.C. § 344 (2006) (“Immunity for persons required to submit to 
examination, to testify, or to provide information in a case under this title may be 
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questions of creditors at that meeting.  The debtor may also be 
deposed in a 2004 examination.134  Each of these proceedings is 
recorded and the examining party has the right to have the 
examination reduced to writing.135 
The Bankruptcy Code anticipates the dilemma of the debtor 
who is asked to provide incriminating testimony under oath.136  The 
Code provides that a debtor may be granted immunity regarding 
incriminating testimony prior to giving the testimony.137  If the debtor 
is granted immunity and persists in refusing to answer questions, the 
debtor may be denied a discharge.138  If the debtor is not granted 
immunity, she may refuse to testify based on a proper assertion of her 
privilege against self-incrimination.139 
Although the Code does not specifically define the type or scope 
of immunity required to compel the debtor to testify, the Court has 
held that the combination of use and derivative use immunity is 
sufficient.140  Transactional immunity is not required.141 
Given the complex decisions that a debtor faces, she needs 
assistance of counsel to avoid the pitfalls.  Counsel’s explanation of 
the debtor’s rights and responsibilities at each juncture protects the 
debtor against the inadvertent loss of the privilege. 
1.  Blanket Invocation is Not a “Proper Assertion” 
Though the debtor may wish to properly assert her privilege 
against self-incrimination, certain requirements must be met for an 
assertion to be proper.  The privilege may be properly asserted if 
there is (1) compelled disclosure that is (2) found to be testimonial 
 
granted. . . .”). 
 134  FED. R. BANKR. P. 2004 (2012).  A 2004 examination is an examination that 
occurs only upon motion of a party in interest as opposed to the 341 meeting which 
is mandatory.  A court reporter may be present during the 2004 examination. 
 135  In re Jackson, 13 F. Cas. 204, 205 (E.D.N.C. 1874). 
 136  See 11 U.S.C. § 542(e) (2006) (stating that subject to any applicable privilege, 
the debtor must turn over financial documents). 
 137  11 U.S.C. § 344 (2006). 
 138  See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(6)(B) (2012) (“[T]he court shall grant the debtor a 
discharge, unless the debtor has refused, in the case on the ground of privilege 
against self-incrimination, to . . . testify, after the debtor has been granted immunity 
with respect to the matter concerning which such privilege was invoked.”). 
 139  In re Gi Yeong Nam, 245 B.R. 216, 224 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2000); In re Potter, 88 
B.R. 843 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1988). 
 140  Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 452 (1972). 
 141  Id. 
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and (3) incriminatory.142  A debtor may not use a blanket invocation 
of the privilege to refuse to answer all questions in a proceeding.143  
Instead, a debtor must be ready to show, related to each question, 
that there is a real danger of incrimination,144 that there is some 
nexus of risk,145 or that the information provided will provide a link in 
the chain of information required for prosecution.146  Furthermore, 
the debtor must show that the fear of prosecution is more than 
fanciful.147 
The Supreme Court has recognized that these requirements for 
invoking privilege create a paradox in that, if a witness is required to 
prove the hazard of prosecution, she would be compelled to 
surrender the very information and protection that the privilege 
against self-incrimination is designed to protect.148  To avoid this 
result, some courts have required the debtor to explain the 
incriminatory nature of specific questions under oath, in camera, or by 
affidavit.149  The debtor may not use the privilege as a basis to refuse 
to attend the section 341 meeting of creditors150 or to refuse to 
 
 142  In re Connelly, 59 B.R. 421, 430–31 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1986). 
 143  Id. at 430; accord In re Brandenberg, No. 06-30709, 2007 WL 117391 (Bankr. 
E.D. Tenn. Jan 10, 2007); see also In re ICS Cybertronics, Inc., 107 B.R. 821, 829 
(Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1989) (holding that a former officer of a corporation was not 
entitled to issue a blanket refusal to testify at an examination under FED. R. BANKR. P. 
2004, but was ordered to answer each question propounded to him unless he 
proffered particularized responses to each, explaining some nexus between the risk 
of criminal prosecution and the information requested). 
 144  In re Morganroth, 718 F.2d 161, 167 (6th Cir. 1983); In re Mudd, 95 B.R. 426, 
427 (Bankr. D. Tex. 1989). 
 145  Martin-Trigona v. Gouletas, 634 F.2d 354, 360 (7th Cir. 1980). 
 146  In re French, 127 B.R. 434, 440 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1991) (holding that a 
Chapter 11 debtor, charged with a felony, may assert her Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination at the first meeting of creditors without losing her right to 
discharge if the debtor is not offered immunity, but must do so as to each question 
posed, and that where the questions would potentially furnish a link in the chain of 
evidence needed to prosecute, no further inquiry is needed). 
 147  In re Mart, 90 B.R. 547, 550 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1988) (permitting a discharge 
where the debtor was potentially involved in her husband’s alleged criminal conduct 
and invoked her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, because the 
fear of prosecution was more than fanciful); see also In re Johnson, 387 B.R. 728 (S.D. 
Ohio 2008) (denying the debtor a discharge where the debtor purported to “plead 
the Fifth” in refusing to answer questions at the first meeting of creditors, but where 
there was no fear of prosecution; rather, the debtor was blatantly trying to avoid 
cooperation with the Trustee). 
 148  See Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486–87 (1951). 
 149  In re Connelly, 59 B.R. 421, 445, 447–48 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1986) 
 150  In re Russell, 392, B.R. 315, 368 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2008). 
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provide the required schedules and statement of financial affairs.151 
2.  The Timing and Consequence of Asserting of the 
Privilege 
A debtor may make a proper assertion of her right against self-
incrimination throughout the bankruptcy process.152  She may invoke 
her right in the completion of the bankruptcy schedules, during oral 
testimony, and responding to requests for production of documents. 
 However, while the debtor may avoid exposing herself to 
incrimination through her direct testimony, she may be subject to 
other consequences.  Among other things, adverse inferences may be 
drawn in the bankruptcy proceedings, adversary proceedings, Rule 
2004 examinations,153 and criminal proceedings.154 
3.  Invocation in the Petition and Schedules 
The Code requires that a debtor file a list of creditors, a 
schedule of assets and liabilities, a schedule of current income and 
current expenses, a statement of the debtor’s financial affairs, and 
other schedules.155  The Code gives the court discretion to allow a 
 
 151  Id at 361. 
 152  See Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 371 (2010) (stating that a suspect’s 
Miranda right to remain silent, stop questioning, or request counsel must be invoked 
“unambiguously”) (quoting Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994)).  It must 
be reasoned that a civil litigant in a non-custodial context, including the debtor, 
would not be allowed to invoke the privilege more easily, and thus the best practice is 
to invoke the privilege through an assertion that is unambiguous. 
 153  Federal Savings & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Sutherlin 109 B.R. 700, 706 (Bankr. E.D. 
La. 1989) (holding that the Receiver of an insolvent bank was entitled to rely upon 
and draw a negative inference from Debtor’s invocation of his 5th Amendment rights 
during a 2004 examination in motion to dismiss case); In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 
836 F.2d 1468, 1476 (4th Cir. 1988) (“[T]he trier of fact may also use the silence of a 
deponent for relevant inference that it creates.”); Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., v. 
Frenville, 67 B.R. 858, 862 (Bankr. D. N.J. 1986) (using adverse inferences to deny 
dischargability to certain debts where the debtor asserted the Fifth Amendment in 
response to questions regarding their dischargability); In re Hanson, 225 B.R. 366, 
371 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1986) (holding that a debtor who invoked the Fifth 
Amendment privilege throughout the discovery process for an adversarial 
proceeding was not allowed to waive the privilege on the day of trial and testify 
because of unfair prejudice and surprise). 
 154  Czarlinsky v. United States, 54 F.2d 889, 893 (10th Cir. 1931), cert. denied, 285 
U.S. 549 (1932) (“It is our opinion that defendant, by filing the schedules in 
bankruptcy without objection, waived his privilege as to any use to which such 
schedules would be put, including evidence in a criminal prosecution.”); see infra 
Part III.B.1. 
 155  11 U.S.C. § 521 (2012); FED. R. BANKR. P. 1007, 1009, 4002, & 9011. 
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debtor to omit certain information.156  Historically, courts have 
allowed the debtor to refrain from turning over incriminating 
schedules.157  Courts have held that debtors must complete schedules 
when there is clearly no direct and apparent self-incrimination that 
necessarily attaches to the information required by the schedules.158  
However, if the court finds that the debtor’s refusal to provide 
information required by the Code is justified under the Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination, it may excuse 
compliance with the requirement.159 
4.  Production of Documents 
At various times throughout the bankruptcy proceedings, the 
debtor may be asked to produce documents related to the 
bankruptcy estate, which is created by the filing of the petition.160  
Examples of such documents include bank statements, tax returns, 
deeds, and titles.  As in other types of civil cases, the Supreme Court 
has held that the incriminating contents of documents in the 
debtor’s possession are not privileged because there has been no 
compulsion to create the documents, and the documents were 
created voluntarily prior to the request for turnover.161  However, the 
Court has found that the act of producing documents itself may be 
sufficiently testimonial to warrant Fifth Amendment protection, even 
though information in certain documents may contain incriminating 
information.162  For instance, by producing the documents, the 
debtor may be making admissions that (1) the documents exist, (2) 
 
 156  See 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(1) (2006) (“[T]he debtor shall file a list of creditors; 
and unless the court orders otherwise, [other schedules].”) (emphasis added). 
 157  See, e.g., In re Kanter, 117 F. 356, 357 (S.D.N.Y. 1902); In re U.S. Hoffman Can 
Corp., 373 F.2d 622, 629 (3d Cir. 1967). 
 158  See, e.g., In re Arend, 286 F. 516, 517–18 (2d Cir. 1922); Padolin v. Lesher 
Warner Dry Goods Co., 210 F. 97, 102–04 (3d Cir. 1914). 
 159  In re U.S. Hoffman Can Corp., 373 F.2d 622, 626–27 (3d Cir. 1967); In re 
Connelly, 59 B.R. 421, 447–48 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1986); In re Kaufman, 35 B.R. 26, 28 
(Bankr. D. Haw. 1983). 
 160  11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2012).  The commencement of a case creates an estate 
comprised of all legal and equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the 
commencement of the estate wherever located and by whomever held except as 
provided by § 541(b) and (c)(2).  The trustee is the representative of the estate.  See 
11 U.S.C. § 323(a) (2012).  Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(4) “[T]he debtor shall . . . 
surrender to the trustee all property of the estate and any recorded information, 
including books, documents, records, and papers, relating to property of the estate, 
whether or not immunity is granted under section 344 of this title . . . .” (emphasis added). 
 161  Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 410 n.11 (1976). 
 162  United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 617 (1984); Fisher, 425 U.S. at 410 (1976). 
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that the documents are in the possession and control of the debtor, 
or (3) that the debtor believes that the documents she produces are 
the documents that were requested, thereby authenticating the 
documents.163  In such a case, a grant of use and derivative use 
immunity is required in order to compel the testimony sought.164 
The first step in determining whether a debtor may invoke her 
privilege against self-incrimination and thus refuse to produce 
documents is to determine whether the documents are property of 
the debtor’s estate.165  The privilege against self-incrimination only 
applies to property in which the debtor holds title.166  If the title to the 
documents is vested in the bankruptcy estate or another third party, 
the debtor may not be able to invoke her privilege to suppress the 
documents.167  If the requested documents are property of the 
bankruptcy estate, courts have found that the turnover of those assets 
is not testimonial and is therefore not in conflict with the privilege 
against self-incrimination.168 
Courts disagree on the proper test for deciding whether 
requested documents are property of the debtor’s estate for the 
purpose of asserting the privilege.  One view is that possession alone 
is a sufficient basis for assertion of the privilege.  The Ninth Circuit 
 
 163  In re Connelly, 59 B.R. 421, 440 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1986). 
 164  Doe, 465 U.S. at 617 (1984); see discussion infra note 171.  
 165  See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2006) (defining property of the estate).  Property 
claimed as exempt is property of the estate until the court allows the exemption or 
the time for objections to exemptions has lapsed.  In re Bucchino, 439 B.R. 761, 770–
71 (Bankr. D. N.M. 2010); In re Campbell, 313 B.R. 313, 320–21 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 
2004); In re Calvin, 329 B.R. 589, 601–02 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2005); Wells Fargo Bank, 
N.A. v. Jimenez, 406 B.R. 935, 940–45 (D. N.M. 2008), vacated, 7-05-15473 MA, 2009 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108903 (Bankr. D. N.M. Apr. 7, 2009).  For the duration that 
documents are property of the estate, the trustee would potentially be able to 
examine (and even photocopy) anything incriminating.  In those jurisdictions that 
require the debtor to have ownership and possession to assert the privilege (see infra 
notes 169 and 171), the debtor would not technically be able to assert the privilege in 
this time period.  See 11 U.S.C. § 522(l) (2006) and FED. R. BANKR. P. 4003(b)(1) for 
requirement to file claim of exemptions and procedure for objections. 
 166  Dier v. Banton, 262 U.S. 147, 149–50 (1923); Ex parte Fuller, 262 U.S. 92, 93–
94  (1923). 
 167  11 U.S.C. § 521(a)(4) (2006); United States v. Falley, 489 F.2d 33, 41 (2d Cir. 
1973); United States v. Egenberg, 443 F.2d 512, 517–18 (3d Cir. 1971); see also In re 
Lufkin, 255 B.R. 204, 210 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2000) (holding that a Debtor-Attorney 
could not assert the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination to prevent a 
receiver, who had been appointed to take possession of law firm prior to involuntary 
bankruptcy, from disclosing documents to a Trustee). 
 168  See In re Krisle, 54 B.R. 330, 340–41 (Bankr. D. S.D. 1985); In re Deveraux, 48 
B.R. 644, 646 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1985); In re Crabtree, 39 B.R. 726, 732 (Bankr. E.D. 
Tenn. 1984); In re Kaufman, 35 B.R. 26, 27–28 (Bankr. D. Haw. 1983). 
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has held that possession of the documents by the debtor may be a 
necessary and sufficient condition to invoke the privilege.169  That 
court reasoned that even if the debtor did not own the requested 
documents, there is the same potential for incrimination based on 
identification, possession, and authentication.170  If however, the 
documents are not property of the estate and the debtor is in 
possession of the documents, then the debtor must show that the act 
of producing the documents is sufficiently testimonial to warrant 
Fifth Amendment protection.171 
The other view is that ownership and possession are necessary.  
For instance, the Second Circuit has held that ownership of documents 
is essential to suppress them on Fifth Amendment grounds.172  In 
order to rightfully assert her privilege against self-incrimination, a 
debtor must show ownership and possession of the requested 
documents, and she must show that they are self-incriminatory.173 
5.  Assertion of the Privilege in Oral Testimony 
During bankruptcy proceedings, the debtor is expected to give 
oral testimony at the meeting of creditors and may be asked to testify 
at 2004 exams or certain hearings.174  Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 344, the 
debtor may be granted immunity regarding her oral testimony under 
Part V of Title 18 of the United States Code for the purposes of this 
examination.175  Neither the Criminal Code nor the Bankruptcy Code 
specifies the type of immunity to be granted, but the Court has held 
that a grant of use and derivative use immunity is sufficient to compel 
the debtor to testify under oath.176 
If the debtor is not offered immunity, the debtor may refuse to 
testify under the privilege and still retain her right to a discharge.177  
The use of the privilege in chapter 7 consumer cases is well 
 
 169  United States v. Cohen, 388 F.2d 464, 468 (9th Cir. 1967). 
 170  Id.  
 171  In re Ross, 156 B.R. 272, 275–77 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1993). 
 172  Falley, 489 F.2d at 41. 
 173  Id.  
 174  11 U.S.C. § 341 (2006); FED. R. BANKR. P. 2004. 
 175  11 U.S.C. § 344 (2006). 
 176  Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 453 (1972). 
 177  11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(6)(A) (2006); In re Minton Grp, Inc., 43 B.R. 705, 709 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984); In re Salzman, 61 B.R. 878, 889 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986); In re 
Connelly, 59 B.R. 421, 426 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1986); In re Hulon, 92 B.R. 670, 673 
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1988). 
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documented.178  However, assertion of the privilege in a chapter 13 
proceeding is problematic because of the requirement that the 
debtor’s plan be submitted in good faith.179  Unless immunity is 
granted, the privilege may be invoked to avoid incriminating 
questions or offering other incriminating information considered 
testimonial whether during discovery or trial.180  The debtor may 
invoke the privilege in bankruptcy to justify a refusal to provide 
information otherwise relevant to the administration of the estate.181 
B.  Adverse Consequences 
1.  Adverse Inferences 
Though the debtor may properly assert her privilege to avoid 
revealing incriminatory evidence, she may face adverse consequences.  
When a debtor invokes her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination in civil proceedings, adverse inferences may be drawn 
from the invocation182 by receivers, Trustees, and the Court.183  In 
some situations, such inferences may lead to certain debts being 
deemed nondischargeable.184 
 
 178  Turner, 43 B.R. at 709. 
 179  11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3) (2006); In re Girdaukas, 92 B.R. 373, 376 (Bankr. E.D. 
Wis. 1988) (supporting the use of the Fifth Amendment in Chapter 7, but noting 
that it may be difficult for a debtor to establish a good faith plan under Chapter 13 
while using the Fifth Amendment privilege). 
 180  Grand Jury Proceedings (Williams) v. United States, 995 F.2d 1013, 1018 n.11 
(11th Cir. 1993). 
 181  In re Hyde, 235 B.R. 539, 542 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), aff’d, 205 F.3d 1323 (2d Cir. 
2000). 
 182  See In re Brandenberg, No. 06-30709, 2007 WL 117391 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. Jan. 
10, 2007). 
 183  See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d 1468, 1476 (4th Cir. 1988) (“[T]he 
trier of fact may also use the silence of a deponent for relevant inferences that it 
creates”); Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Sutherlin, 109 B.R. 700, 706 (E.D. La. 1989) 
(stating that a receiver was entitled to draw a negative inference from the debtor’s 
invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights during a Rule 2004 examination and rely 
upon the inference in its motion to dismiss the case). 
 184  In re Asbury, Bankr. No. 08-21989, (Adversary No. 09-02012), 2011 WL 44911 
(W.D. Mo. Jan. 6, 2011) (relying, in part, on a debtor’s assertion of the Fifth 
Amendment as to false statements regarding assets, in determining that the chapter 
7 debts were non-dischargeable under 523(a)(2)(B)); Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A. 
v. Frenville, 67 B.R. 858, 862 (Bankr. D. N.J. 1986) (using adverse inferences to deny 
dischargeability to certain debts where the debtor asserted the 5th Amendment to 
questions regarding their dischargeability). 
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2.  Denial of Discharge 
The court may deny a discharge185 if the debtor has refused in 
the case to obey a lawful order of the court, to testify to self-
incriminating matters after being granted immunity, or to respond to 
a question approved by the court without a proper assertion of the 
right against self-incrimination.186  If the debtor refuses a court 
ordered inspection of documents, there is no violation of the Code if 
the refusal is based on a proper assertion of the right against self-
incrimination.187 
Although a 2004 exam is another instance in which a debtor may 
assert the privilege, the bankruptcy court does not implicitly certify 
questions posed at a Rule 2004 examination.188  Thus, validly asserting 
a debtor’s Fifth Amendment rights, without more, is not sufficient 
grounds to deny a discharge.189 
3.  Inability to Testify in Other Proceedings 
Some consequences may affect the debtor’s ability to testify in 
subsequent or contemporaneous (parallel) proceedings.  For 
instance, if a debtor has refused to testify in prior proceedings based 
on a proper assertion of her rights, then the debtor may be barred 
from testifying in a later proceeding to any matters that were raised 
or could have been raised in the prior proceeding.190  The debtor’s 
inability to testify in a later proceeding complicates strategic planning 
for future proceedings and makes assessment of the impact on 
anticipated proceedings difficult, if not impossible. 
 
 185  11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(1)–(12) (2006). The Chapter 7 discharge provision lists 
twelve grounds for objection to discharge. 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) and (c) (2006) lists 
the grounds for objection to discharge in chapter 13. The grounds for objection to 
discharge in Chapter 12 are listed in 11 U.S.C. § 1228(a) and (c) (2006). The 
grounds for objection to the discharge for an individual debtor in Chapter 11 are 
listed at 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(3) (2006).  
 186  11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(6) (2006). 
 187  See In re Bartel, No. 05-13134, 2009 WL 2461727, (Bankr. D. Mass. Aug. 10, 
2009). 
 188  See In re Merena, 413 B.R. 792, 819 (Bankr. D. Mont. 2009), aff’d, In re Merena, 
No. 08-60066-7, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 5531 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Dec. 10, 2009). 
 189  See In re Ogden, No. UT-98-042, 1999 Bankr. LEXIS 1976, at *7 (10th Cir. 
B.A.P. (Utah)). 
 190  See, e.g., In re Nat’l Audit Def. Network, 367 B.R. 207, 216–17 (Bankr. D. Nev. 
2007); United States v. Talco Contractors, Inc., 153 F.R.D. 501, 504–07  (W.D.N.Y. 
1994); In re Hanson, 225 B.R. 366, 372 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1998), aff’d, No. 99-CV-55, 
1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8442 (W.D. Mich. June 1, 1999). 
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4.  Contempt of Court and Imprisonment 
Another consequence the debtor may face is contempt of 
court.191  A proper invocation of the privilege in one hearing does not 
automatically carry the privilege over to subsequent hearings.192  If the 
debtor asserts her privilege as to certain questions in one hearing, but 
testifies to those facts in a later hearing, she is not entitled to then re-
assert her privilege as to those matters.193  If the debtor disobeys a 
court order regarding those matters, supposing to rely on her 
previously asserted privilege, the court may use its contempt power to 
impose sanctions on the debtor, including fines and imprisonment.194 
5.  Dismissal of the Bankruptcy 
Even if the debtor’s Fifth Amendment assertion of the privilege 
is properly based, her case may be dismissed if her assertion hampers 
the trustee’s ability to administer the bankruptcy estate.195  The court 
may dismiss the case with or without prejudice.  If the court dismisses 
the case without prejudice, the debtor may file her petition after the 
threat of prosecution passes.196  Although this may seem like a 
reasonable solution, it is problematic for the debtor because the 
protection afforded against creditors’ claims is lost when the 
automatic stay is no longer in place.  In addition, there are negative 
implications for the debtor in attempting to file another bankruptcy 
within the succeeding year.197 
 
 191  11 U.S.C. § 105 (2006); FED. R. BANKR. P. 9020; see also supra note 118. 
 192  See In re Weerawat, No. 06-40098-JBR, 2007 WL 710160 (Bankr. D. Mass. Mar. 
6, 2007). 
 193  Id. 
 194  Id.; see also Martin-Trigona v. Belford, 732 F.2d 170, 173–74 (2d Cir. 1984); In 
re Sterling-Harris Ford, Inc., 315 F.2d 277, 278–79 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 
U.S. 814 (1963). 
 195  See In re Blan, 239 B.R. 385, 397–98 (W.D. Ark. 1999); In re Moses, 792 F. Supp. 
529, 532–36, 38 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1992); In re Fekos, 148 B.R. 10 (Bankr. W.D. 
Penn. 1992); Scarfia v. Holiday Bank, 129 B.R. 671, 675 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990) 
(stating that a court could dismiss a petition sua sponte if it found that the trustee 
was unable to administer the estate), aff’d, 33 F.3d 1383 (11th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 
513 U.S. 1190 (1995); In re Connelly, 59 B.R. 421, 446–48 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1986). 
 196  See In re Pelko, 201 B.R. 331, 333–34 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1996). 
 197  11 U.S.C. §362(c)(3) (2006).  The refiling of a consumer bankruptcy case by 
an individual after a dismissal within the preceding one year period of a pending 
consumer case other than under 11 U.S.C. § 707(b) results in the termination of the 
stay with respect to the debtor on the 30th day after the filing of the later case.  The 
court may extend the stay only after notice and a hearing.  The debtor has the 
burden of demonstrating that the filing of the later case is in good faith as to the 
creditors to be stayed.  A case is presumed not to be in good faith, and the 
presumption must be overcome by clear and convincing evidence. 
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6.  Implications in Criminal Proceedings 
Invocation or waiver of the privilege against self-incrimination in 
bankruptcy may have consequences in the criminal prosecution 
context as well.198  Absent immunity, plaintiffs may invoke the Fifth 
Amendment in response to incriminating questions during discovery 
or trial at any stage of the criminal process.199  Although a bankruptcy 
court may enforce a validly issued protective order,200 a grand jury 
subpoena may take precedence over a validly issued protective 
order.201  This leaves the debtor at risk during the pendency of the 
bankruptcy even when the incriminating information appears to be 
protected. 
C.  Waiver of the Privilege 
A knowing and intelligent waiver of the right is not required in a 
noncustodial setting.202  Thus, it is possible for a debtor to lose the 
benefit of the privilege in the context of a bankruptcy without actual 
knowledge of the waiver because the setting is viewed as 
noncustodial.203 
The Supreme Court has made it clear that the privilege is waived 
if it is not invoked.204  In other words, the privilege is not self-
executing.  Under certain circumstances, the waiver may be inferred 
from a witness’ course of conduct or prior statements concerning the 
 
 198  See, e.g., In re Harris, 221 U.S. 274, 278–79 (1911) (Holmes, J.) (“That is one of 
the misfortunes of bankruptcy if it follows crime.  The right not to be compelled to 
be a witness against oneself is not a right to appropriate property that may tell one’s 
story.”). 
 199  Grand Jury Proceedings (Williams) v. United States, 995 F.2d 1013, 1018 n.11 
(11th Cir. 1993). 
 200  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(c); Martindell v. Int’l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 594 F.2d 291 (2d 
Cir. 1979). 
 201  In re Grand Jury Subpoena served on Meserve, Mumper & Hughes, 62 F.3d 
1222, 1225 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 202  Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648 (1976). 
 203  Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652 (2004) (holding that citizen is not in 
custody if a reasonable person in his situation would have felt free to “terminate the 
interrogation and leave”); Scarfia v. Holiday Bank, 129 B.R. 671, 675 (Bankr. M.D. 
Fla. 1990).  Compare 11 U.S.C. § 303 (2006), (stating that the traditional rule that “a 
waiver will not be lightly inferred,” applies in involuntary cases), with In re Hulon, 92 
B.R. 670, 673 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1988) (stating that a waiver will also not be lightly 
inferred even in a voluntary case). 
 204  Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 371 (1951) (stating that he privilege 
against self-incrimination is waived if it is not invoked) (citing United States v. 
Murdock, 284 U.S. 141, 148 (1931)).   
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subject of the case.205  The waiver is not to be lightly inferred, and the 
courts indulge every reasonable presumption against finding a 
testimonial waiver.206  However, the mere fact that a waiver may be 
inferred creates a danger of inadvertent incrimination for the debtor.  
Courts will infer that an individual waived the privilege if the 
statements have created a significant likelihood that the finder of fact 
will be prone to rely on a distorted view of the truth, and the debtor 
had reason to know that her prior statements would be interpreted as 
a waiver.207 
Filing bankruptcy schedules and statements may constitute a 
waiver of the privilege.208  In an adversary proceeding, filing an answer 
and responding to discovery requests may cause a waiver.209  Likewise, 
an affidavit operates like a testimonial statement and may be 
interpreted as a waiver.210  On the other hand, answering some 
questions prior to asserting the privilege will not necessarily operate 
as a waiver as to all questions presented.211 
Because there is no clear line of demarcation to signal the 
unintentional waiver of the privilege by inference, the debtor is at 
risk to unwittingly allow access to both disclosed and undisclosed 
information.212  This may occur based on a witness’s course of 
conduct or prior statements concerning the case and without an 
inquiry into whether or not the witness was aware of the privilege and 
 
 205  In re Litton, 74 B.R. 557, 560 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1987). 
 206  In re Hulon, 92 B.R. at 673 (citing Klein v. Harris, 667 F.2d 274, 287 (2d Cir. 
1981)) (stating that waiver is not to be lightly inferred, and courts indulge every 
reasonable presumption against finding a testimonial waiver; waiver inferred if (1) 
the statements have created a significant likelihood that the finder of fact will be left 
with and prone to rely on a distorted view of the truth; and (2) the debtor had 
reason to know that her prior statements would be interpreted as a waiver). But see 
Holiday Bank, 129 B.R. at 675 (stating that a debtor is before the Bankruptcy Court 
voluntarily and is not entitled to as much consideration in being compelled to testify 
as another witness would who had no interest in the proceeding). 
 207  In re Hulon, 92 B.R. at 673. 
 208  See In re Kroh, 87 B.R. 1004, 1005–06 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1988). 
 209  Id. 
 210  In re Edmond, 934 F.2d 1304, 1307–08 (4th Cir. 1991). 
 211  In re Jacques, 115 B.R. 272, 273 (D. Nev. 1990). 
 212   With regard to the requested items which may not have been previously 
disclosed, or to the extent that such commitment may not be legally binding, the 
privilege has been lost or waived for failure to have raised it timely.  As the Supreme 
Court held: “[A] witness loses the privilege by failing to claim it properly even though 
the information being sought remains undisclosed when the privilege is claimed.”  In re 
Lederman, 140 B.R. 49, 54 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1992) (quoting Garner v. United States, 
424 U.S. 648, 653 (1976)). 
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chose to waive it consciously.213 
1.  Depositions and 2004 Examinations 
The bankruptcy debtor is more at risk to unknowingly waive the 
privilege than the person in a custodial setting.  The debtor may be 
deemed to have waived the privilege for purposes of a 2004 
examination if she testifies at an earlier deposition on incriminating 
matters.  This remains true even if her attorney did not advise her of 
the privilege or instruct her not to answer in the earlier deposition, 
and even if she was not aware at the time that the statements might 
be incriminating.214  In similar fashion, the debtor may have waived 
the privilege in bankruptcy proceedings by voluntarily answering 
questions and follow-up questions in earlier depositions regarding 
the same subject matter, despite the fact that counsel was not present 
at the depositions and the debtor was not informed of the privilege.215  
In contrast, the failure to raise the privilege as an objection to 
subpoenaed documents has been held not to constitute a waiver.216  
Consequently, the likelihood of inadvertent waiver of the privilege by 
the debtor can be seen to increase dramatically depending on the 
circumstances. 
The debtor’s ability to waive the privilege inadvertently due to 
lack of knowledge of its existence places the uninformed debtor at a 
serious disadvantage when compared to her more informed 
counterpart.  The debtor’s loss of the privilege through the 
inadvertence or neglect of counsel highlights the critical importance 
of educating the individual debtor and counsel about the privilege.  
Without disclosure to the debtor of the existence of the privilege, the 
probability of inadvertent waiver and any ensuing negative 
consequences falls disproportionately on the poor, the learning 
disabled, the uneducated, and the debtor represented by ineffective 
counsel, or those in our society who are least able to recover from the 
waiver and are most likely to suffer the consequences of waiver.217  
 
 213  In re Donald Sheldon & Co., 193 B.R. 152, 162 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996) (citing 
Klein v. Harris, 667 F.2d 274, 287 (2d Cir. 1981)). 
 214  In re A&L Oil Co., 200 B.R. 21, 27 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1996). 
 215  In re Cotillion Invs., Inc., 343 B.R. 344, 351–52 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2006). 
 216  DG Creditor Corp. v. Dabah (In re DG Acquisition Corp.), 151 F.3d 75 (2d Cir. 
1998). 
 217  One author characterizes the case law pertaining to learning disabled adults as 
follows: 
Colorado v. Connelly held that although the defendant was mentally 
ill, his waiver was voluntary, thus valid. . . .  The majority reasoned that 
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Aside from issues of due process and equal protection under the law, 
lack of notice of the privilege goes to the central issue of fundamental 
fairness that relates to the projected image and the perceived image 
of our system of justice as unbiased, impartial, and evenhanded. 
Because legal entities are not considered persons for purposes of 
invoking the privilege, an individual’s ability to claim the privilege 
may be affected by her prior testimony, actions and events regarding 
a legal entity.  For instance, the debtor corporation’s principal may 
not invoke her Fifth Amendment privilege to avoid answering 
questions at a 2004 examination218 when she has previously pled guilty 
in a criminal court on the issues.219  On the other hand, if the debtor’s 
principal answers, “I don’t know” or “I don’t recall” to almost every 
question in an earlier deposition, the privilege may be preserved and 
claimed in a subsequent deposition despite the fact that it was not 
formally invoked in the earlier deposition.220 
2.  Schedules 
The law is well settled that if the debtor fails to invoke the 
privilege at the time she files her schedules, the privilege is waived as 
to the facts shown, and the information will be admissible evidence 
against her in a criminal prosecution.221  Because the debtor’s 
schedules are required and must be filed with the petition, any 
potential for incrimination should be explained to the debtor prior 
to the filing.  Otherwise, the debtor may inadvertently waive the 
privilege, be incriminated irreversibly, face criminal prosecution 
based on her own supplied evidence, and suffer a denial of her 
discharge.  As stated above, the fact that the debtor has not been 
properly advised by counsel or does not understand the privilege will 
 
the sole concern of the Fifth Amendment, on which Miranda was 
based, is governmental coercion. The Court stated that under a due 
process analysis, beginning with Brown v. Mississippi, all cases deciding 
the constitutionality of a confession have contained a substantial 
element of police coercion.  The Connelly Court stated that it is not 
the role of the Court to make sweeping inquiries into the state of mind 
of a criminal defendant who has confessed” unless there is evidence of 
police coercion. 
Steven A. Greenburg, Learning Disabled Juveniles & Miranda Rights—What Constitutes 
Voluntary, Knowing, & Intelligent Waiver, 21 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 487, 494–95 
(1991) (citations omitted). 
 218  FED. R. BANKR. P. 2004 (“The court may order the examination of any entity.”). 
 219  In re Cassandra Grp., 338 B.R. 600, 604 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
 220  Horowitz v. Sheldon, 193 B.R. 152. (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
 221  Ensign v. Pennsylvania, 227 U.S. 592, 599 (1913); Czarlinsky v. United States, 
54 F.2d 889, 893 (10th Cir. 1931), cert. denied, 285 U.S. 549 (1932). 
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not serve to avoid the waiver or minimize any damage resulting from 
the admissibility of the evidence.222 
3.  The 341 Meeting 
The Court, in addressing the issue of waiver in the context of the 
first meeting of creditors, has spoken plainly.  If the debtor 
voluntarily testifies at the 341 meeting without invoking the privilege, 
she may waive the privilege for later proceedings as to all matters 
related to the scope of her testimony,223 whether or not her waiver was 
knowing and intelligent.224  As noted above, waiver is inferred when 
the testimony creates a significant likelihood that the judge or jury 
will rely on a distorted view of the truth, and the debtor has reason to 
know that her prior statements will be interpreted as a waiver.225  
Equally problematic is that a blanket invocation of the privilege is not 
a “proper assertion” and thus will not suffice to protect the debtor.226 
D.  The Dangers of Parallel Proceedings 
A debtor faces a particular risk if she is exposed to parallel 
proceedings.  Parallel proceedings are any simultaneous proceedings 
based on the same facts that serve as a basis for all of the claims.227  
 
 222  In re A&L Oil Co., 200 B.R. 21, 27 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1996). 
 223  Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 428 (1983) (noting that if the debtor 
voluntarily testifies at the 341 meeting without invoking the privilege, she may waive 
the privilege for later proceedings as to all matters related to the scope of her 
testimony). 
 224  Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 654–55, n.9 (1976) (observing that 
knowing and intelligent waiver is not required in a noncustodial setting: “an 
individual may lose the benefit of the privilege [against self-incrimination] without 
making a knowing and intelligent waiver”). 
 225  In re Hulon, 92 B.R. 670, 673–75 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1988) (stating that waiver 
is inferred if the “(1) the statements have created a significant likelihood that the 
finder of fact will be left with and prone to rely on a distorted view of the truth, and 
(2) the debtor had reason to know that her prior statements would be interpreted as 
a waiver of the privilege”). 
 226  In re Connelly, 59 B.R. 421, 430 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1986) (finding that a blanket 
assertion of the privilege is not proper where debtor refused to answer 341 questions 
and had not scheduled creditors, debts, or assets, and liabilities, and where debtor 
provided no evidence of potential criminal investigation.  The requisites for asserting 
the privilege are 1) a compelled disclosure; 2) found to be testimonial; and 3) 
incriminatory).  See also In re Brandenberg, No. 06–30709, 2007 WL 117391, at *2 
(Bankr. E.D. Tenn. Jan. 10, 2007) (finding that a blanket invocation is not 
sufficient). 
 227  See 17 C.F.R. § 12.24 (defining parallel proceedings in the context of 
commodity and security exchanges as “[a] civil court proceeding, involving one or 
more of the respondents as a party, which is pending at the time the [other] 
complaint is filed and involves claims or counterclaims that are based on the same set 
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This situation arises when the debtor is involved in a bankruptcy and 
a criminal proceeding at the same time.  As explained below, the risk 
of adverse consequences remains even when the debtor claims the 
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in both 
proceedings.228 
Imagine a scenario in which a debtor in bankruptcy is also the 
subject of a criminal proceeding.  If the debtor were involved in only 
the criminal proceeding, the prosecuting authority would be limited 
in its discovery of information.229  The trustee in bankruptcy, however, 
is entitled to a wider berth during discovery in bankruptcy because a 
debtor is mandated to file schedules and answer certain questions 
under oath.230  Therefore, the prosecuting authority could have access 
to information via the civil proceeding that it can use in the criminal 
proceeding.231 
Under some circumstances, if the debtor’s availability for 
examination by the trustee is in doubt, the debtor may be arrested by 
law enforcement officials, held in custody until a detention hearing, 
and released only upon certain conditions.232  If the debtor’s attorney 
 
of facts which serve as a basis for all of the claims in the reparations complaint”); 
Christian Babich, Comment, Parallel Proceedings: The Government’s Double-Team 
Approach and the Degradation of Constitutional Protections, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 753, 
754 (2007); Carl H. Loewenson, Jr., Parallel Proceedings, available at 
http://www.mofo.com/files/Publication/b72e0c65-297f-455f-a9bb-6e0b63eb28c2
/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/bd3bc6f0-6563-4f4b-a3f2-0c18189b5d98
/04PLIDO.pdf (defining parallel proceedings as “two or more investigations or 
actions, concerning allegations arising from the same (or substantially the same) set 
of facts, proceed simultaneously or successively against the same or related parties”). 
 228  See Walter P. Loughlin, Fighting on Two Fronts: Parallel Proceedings and Challenges 
at the Intersection of Criminal and Civil Law, 32 METROPOLITAN CORPORATE COUNSEL 
(Oct. 1, 2006), available at http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/pdf/2006/October
/32.pdf (last visited Aug. 16, 2013) (outlining restrictions that courts have put on the 
government in parallel proceedings). 
 229  See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16; Middleton v. United States, 401 A.2d 109, 115 (D.C. Cir. 
1979) (emphasizing limits on discovery rights to the government in criminal cases 
based on 18 U.S.C. § 3500); see also infra Part 0 
 230  11 U.S.C. § 521 (2006) (providing that the debtor shall perform certain duties 
including, but not limited to, filing a list of creditors, a schedule of assets and 
liabilities, a schedule of income and expenses, a statement of financial affairs, and a 
statement of intentions regarding secured property; as well as furnishing the trustee 
copies of payroll records, a Federal tax return for the most recent tax year, and 
photo identification). 
 231  One possible procedural remedy is for the bankruptcy court to stay the 
proceedings pending the outcome of the criminal proceedings so that the debtor 
can then proceed with confidence having finally resolved the related issues.  See supra 
note 196. 
 232  FED. R. BANKR. P. 2005(c); 18 U.S.C. § 3142(a)–(g) (2006). 
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is not sensitive to these issues, the debtor may be exposed to the 
unnecessary risk of criminal liability.233  Although courts have reacted 
negatively to the government’s invocation of both civil and criminal 
processes in parallel proceedings, such conduct is not prohibited, 
and still presents a risk of inadvertent disclosure to a debtor.234 
1.  Protective Orders and Grand Jury Subpoenas 
The problematic nature of parallel proceedings can be seen in 
the procedural interplay between competing parties and the courts in 
separate civil and criminal actions.  One example is when a grand 
jury subpoena duces tecum conflicts with a protective order.  The Courts 
of Appeal have sometimes reached different results in similar 
situations.235 
In one instance, a protective order enforced by the bankruptcy 
court to quash a subpoena duces tecum from the United States Attorney 
was deemed a “de facto grant of immunity,”236  despite the court’s 
 
 233  68% of the 1,245,205 licensed attorneys in the U.S. are in private practice.  
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, Lawyer Demographics (2011), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/marketresearch/Public
Documents/lawyer_demographics_2012_revised.authcheckdam.pdf).  The 
Martindale-Hubbell database lists 39,126 bankruptcy attorneys in the United States. 
Only 4,756 attorneys are listed as practicing both bankruptcy and criminal law.  
MARTINDALE.COM,http://www.martindale.com/Results.aspx?ft=1&frm=freesearch&af
s=Bankruptcy (last visited Aug. 16, 2013).)  Arguably, those 4,756 attorneys are better 
prepared to raise the Fifth Amendment in bankruptcy proceedings because their 
practice would encounter it on a more regular basis. 
 234  See Loughlin, supra note 228 at 32 (Oct. 1, 2006) 
http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/pdf/2006/ October/32.pdf (last visited Aug. 16, 
2013) (outlining restrictions that courts have put on the government in parallel 
proceedings). 
 235  Compare Martindell v. ITT, 594 F.2d 291, 296 (2d Cir. 1979) (“Absent a 
showing of improvidence in the grant of a Rule 26(c) protective order or some 
extraordinary circumstance or compelling need, a witness should be entitled to rely 
upon the enforceability of a protective order against any third parties.”), with In re 
Grand Jury Subpoena, 836 F.2d 1468, 1478 (4th Cir. 1988) (finding that a valid 
protective order was not sufficient grounds to quash the subpoena duces tecum), In re 
Grand Jury Proceedings (Williams) v. United States, 995 F.2d 1013, 1020 (11th Cir. 
1993) (stating that a Rule 26(c) protective order does not shield relevant 
information from a later grand jury investigation), and In re Grand Jury Subpoena 
Served on Meserve, Mumper & Hughes, 62 F.3d 1222, 1227 (9th Cir. 1995) 
(adopting a per se rule that grand jury subpoenas take precedence over validly issued 
Rule 26(c) protective orders). 
 236  In re Grand Jury Subpoena (Under Seal), 836 F.2d 1468, 1475 (4th Cir. 1988) 
(stating that a protective order, when enforced by the bankruptcy court to quash a 
subpoena duces tecum from the U.S. Attorney, works as a “de facto grant of 
immunity,” however, 6003(a) states that the power to choose who may receive 
immunity is exclusively within the Executive Branch). 
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acknowledgement that the power to grant immunity is reserved to the 
Executive Branch.237  In one case, the court gave precedence to a 
grand jury subpoena over a valid protective order compelling the 
debtor to produce incriminating documents.238 
In yet another case, the court held that absent a showing of 
improvidence in the grant of a protective order, exceptional 
circumstance, or compelling need, a witness is entitled to rely on the 
enforceability of a protective order against any third parties, 
including the government.239  The court held that a protective order 
should not be vacated or modified merely to accommodate the state’s 
desire to inspect protected testimony for possible use in a criminal 
investigation, either as evidence or as the subject of a possible perjury 
charge.240 
Even when the protective order is given precedence over the 
grand jury subpoena, the trier of fact may be permitted to draw an 
inference from the witness’s silence.241  Nevertheless, the Court has 
held that the witness may not be compelled against a valid assertion 
of the Fifth Amendment privilege to repeat prior “immunized 
testimony” verbatim without a contemporaneous assurance of 
immunity.242  The Court’s holding also extended to the compulsion of 
closely tracking testimony by the witness as it relates to prior 
“immunized testimony.”243 
2.  Differences in Civil and Criminal Discovery 
Neither party is obliged to reveal much information during the 
discovery process in criminal proceedings.  Under the Federal Rules, 
a defendant in a criminal proceeding is entitled to receive only his 
own statements, his prior criminal record, items that are “material to 
preparing the defense,” items the government plans to use in its case-
in-chief, and items belonging to or obtained from the defendant.244  
 
 237  In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Williams) v. United States, 995 F.2d 1013, 1020 
(11th Cir. 1993) (stating that a Rule 26(c) protective order does not shield relevant 
information from a later grand jury investigation). 
 238  In re Grand Jury Subpoena Served on Meserve, Mumper & Hughes), 62 F.3d 
1222, 1227 (9th Cir. 1995). 
 239  Martindell v. ITT, 594 F.2d 291, 296 (2d Cir. 1979); See also In re Grand Jury 
Subpoena (Roach), 138 F.3d 442, 445 (1st Cir. 1998). 
 240  Martindell, 594 F.2d at 296. 
 241  In re Grand Jury Subpoena under seal, 836 F.2d 1468, 1476. (4th Cir. 1988), 
cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1240 (1988). 
 242  Pilsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 263 (1983). 
 243  Id. 
 244  FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 (a)(1); See Loewenson, supra note 227. 
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Additionally, the defendant is required to disclose only evidence for 
her case-in-chief, and only where the defendant made a reciprocal 
request.245 
In a civil action, however, both parties are entitled to all relevant, 
non-privileged material “reasonably calculated to lead to the 
discovery of admissible evidence.”246  Thus, the scope of discovery in 
civil actions is often limited only by the zeal of the litigants.  The 
evidentiary standard while perhaps excluding “witch hunts” may 
often fairly be characterized as a “fishing expedition.”247 
Litigants are not required to prove that a line of inquiry will lead 
to admissible evidence.248  Instead, they are merely required to make a 
reasonable argument that the information could.249  In other words, 
access to information in the civil setting hinges on whether, in the 
estimation of the court, a litigant’s particular inquiry may arguably 
capture information that points toward admissible evidence.  While 
this discovery rule leaves some information off limits, it rightfully 
encourages the parties’ search for the truth by providing a flexible, 
fluid, and somewhat unpredictable standard.250 
3.  Discovery in Bankruptcy and the Risk of Loss of the 
Privilege 
In bankruptcy, the discovery provisions are similar to those of 
other civil proceedings, but distinctive in many ways.  Each form of 
discovery creates an opportunity for loss of the privilege.  For 
example, the Code requires the debtor to appear at a meeting 
convened by the United States Bankruptcy trustee for oral 
examination under oath.251  This meeting is similar to a public 
deposition and is referred to as the meeting of creditors or 341 
meeting.  The debtor in each case is subject to interrogation by any 
appearing creditor, the panel trustee, any examiner in the case, and 
 
 245  See Loewenson, supra note 227.  But see Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) 
(finding that the state has an obligation to furnish exculpatory evidence in its 
possession). 
 246  FED. R. CIV. P. 26 (b)(1); see Loewenson, supra note 227, at 24–25. 
 247  See Wuterich v. Murtha, 562 F.3d 375, 386 (D.C. Cir. 2009); Hickman v. Taylor, 
329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947). 
 248  See Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978) (emphasis 
added). 
 249  Id. 
 250  See Eggleston v. Chicago Journeymen Plumbers’ Local Union No. 130, U. A., 
657 F.2d 890, 903 (7th Cir. 1981). 
 251  11 U.S.C. § 341 (2006).  See supra Part III.C.3. 
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the United States trustee.252 
The scope of the examination is limited to “the acts, conduct, 
property, liabilities, and financial condition of the debtor, and any 
other matter that may affect the administration of the debtor’s estate 
or to the debtor’s right to a discharge.”253  The Code description of 
the examination’s scope appears restrictive by use of the phrase 
“[t]he examination . . . may relate only to,” yet when the provision is 
read in its entirety, the breadth of the permitted inquiry is notably 
sweeping and detailed.254  Refusal or inability of the debtor to attend 
the 341 meeting, to furnish information required by the Code, or to 
cooperate with the trustee may result in dismissal of the bankruptcy, 
conversion, or denial of the discharge.255 
In addition to the requirement that the debtor testify at the 341 
meeting, the court may order the examination of the debtor on the 
motion of any party in interest.256  Such examinations are often 
referred to as 2004 examinations and the scope of inquiry is the same 
as for the 341 meeting.257  The debtor may be compelled to attend the 
examination in the same manner as a witness at a trial in a United 
States District Court.258  The court may designate that the debtor be 
examined at any time and place.259 
4. The Debtor’s Failure to Appear, Incarceration, and the 
Need for Notice of the Privilege 
The debtor may be held in custody and treated as a criminal in 
some instances even though no criminal charges have been filed.  If 
the debtor is deemed necessary for the proper administration of the 
estate, and is alleged by affidavit to be avoiding examination, the 
 
 252  11 U.S.C. § 343 (2012). 
 253  FED. R. BANKR. P. 2004(b). 
 254  See id. 
 255  11 U.S.C. § 707 (a)(1) (providing that the court may dismiss a case under 
Chapter 7 for cause including unreasonable delay by the debtor that is prejudicial to 
creditors); 11 U.S.C. § 521 (i)(4),(j)(1) (providing that the court may decline to 
dismiss the case if the debtor tried in good faith to file the required information and 
that the best interests of the creditors would be served by administration of the 
estate; or if the debtor failed to file a tax return that becomes due after 
commencement of the case, the court shall convert or dismiss the case whichever is 
in the best interests of the creditors and the estate). 
 256  FED. R. BANKR. P. 2004(a) (emphasis added). 
 257  FED. R. BANKR. P. 2004(b); See supra Part III.C.1. 
 258  FED. R. BANKR. P. 2004(c); FED. R. BANKR. P. 9016 (incorporating by reference 
FED. R. CIV. P. 45 and thus providing for the form, issuance and service of subpoenas 
ad testificandum and duces tecum for trials, hearings, and depositions). 
 259  FED. R. BANKR. P. 2004(d). 
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court may order law enforcement to bring the debtor to court 
without delay.260  The grounds for such an order include a sworn 
allegation that “there is reasonable cause to believe that the debtor is 
about to leave or has left [her] residence or principal place of 
business to avoid examination;” or has willfully disobeyed a subpoena 
or order to appear for examination.261 
Whenever the debtor is found in a judicial district other than 
that from which the order was issued, the debtor may be taken into 
custody and removed either to the court issuing the order or the 
nearest available United States magistrate judge, bankruptcy judge, or 
district judge.262 
If the judge finds that the person in custody is the debtor, the 
debtor is released on conditions to ensure her prompt appearance 
before the court that issued the order to compel attendance.263  In 
deciding conditions to assure the debtor’s attendance for 
examination, obedience for further examination, and appearance for 
purposes of removal from another jurisdiction, the court is governed 
by the provisions and policies of the federal criminal code.264  The 
applicable section with regard to release or detention pending trial 
provides a number of factors that the court must consider with an eye 
towards the imposition of the least restrictive means of securing the 
attendance of the debtor.265  The debtor may, in this circumstance, be 
taken into custody, held until the detention hearing, and be dealt 
with in all respects as a criminal defendant pending her rebuttal of 
the allegations based on an affidavit.266  In this situation, the debtor is 
clearly in a custodial setting, albeit in a bankruptcy proceeding, and 
the debtor should be provided notice of her privilege against self-
incrimination.267  Yet, despite the obvious need for notice, there is no 
 
 260  FED. R. BANKR. P. 2005(a). 
 261  Id. 
 262  FED. R. BANKR. P. 2005(b). 
 263  Id. 
 264  FED. R. BANKR. P. 2005(c); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3146(a)–(b) (2006) (defining the 
offense of failure to appear and providing for punishment for failure to appear in 
criminal proceedings). 
 265  18 U.S.C. § 3142(a)–(g) (2006) (setting forth the court’s procedure in 
detention hearings in criminal proceedings and the factors to be considered). 
 266  FED. R. BANKR. P. 2005(c); see 18 U.S.C. § 3142(a)–(g) (2012) (setting forth the 
court’s procedure in detention hearings in criminal proceedings and the factors to 
be considered). 
 267  Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (holding that an individual 
under custodial interrogation is entitled to warning (notice) of her rights to remain 
silent, end questioning, and to an attorney); Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 
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provision requiring that such notice be given. 
E.  The Compulsion of Testimony 
As noted above,268 immunity is a term of art with many nuanced 
meanings that depend on context.  The types of immunity that are 
relevant for the purposes of this Article are transactional immunity, 
use immunity, and derivative use immunity.  Transactional immunity 
is a grant of immunity that shields the witness from any exposure to 
criminal liability that is related to a particular transaction.269  Use 
immunity is more limited than transactional immunity: the witness is 
protected only from the “use” of the witness’ testimony in any 
criminal proceeding against the witness.270  The value of the privilege 
against self-incrimination is reduced when use immunity, rather than 
transactional immunity, is used to supplant the debtor’s privilege 
because of the degree to which protection from criminal prosecution 
is lost.271  Derivative use immunity is closely related to use immunity.  
The use of evidence that is derived from the witness’ testimony, 
“fruits” of the immunized testimony, is denied to the state when the 
debtor is given derivative use immunity.272 
The law has changed over time as it relates to the type of 
immunity that suffices to justify the compulsion of testimony in the 
face of the proper assertion of the privilege.273  Under prior law, the 
debtor was allowed to refuse to answer incriminating questions even 
though the Bankruptcy Act (the Act) provided automatic limited274 use 
 
659 (2004) (holding that citizen is not in custody if a reasonable person in his 
situation would have felt free to “terminate the interrogation and leave”). 
 268  See supra Part I.E. 
 269  See, e.g., Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 586 (1892). 
 270  Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n of N.Y. Harbor, 378 U.S. 52, 103 (1964), 
abrogated by United States v. Balsys, 542 U.S. 666 (2007). 
 271  Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 466–67, (1972) (Douglas, J., 
dissenting). 
 272  Murphy, 378 U.S. at 79 (“[W]e hold the constitutional rule to be that a state 
witness may not be compelled to give testimony which may be incriminating under 
federal law unless the compelled testimony and its fruits cannot be used in any manner 
by federal officials in connection with a criminal prosecution against him.”). 
 273  Counselman, 142 U.S. at 547 (required transactional immunity); Kastigar, 406 
U.S. at 441 (1972) (overruling Counselman on that point and substituted use and 
derivative use immunity as a sufficient basis to compel testimony as against an 
assertion of the privilege). 
 274  The immunity was limited in two ways.  The protection afforded was restricted 
to the debtor’s testimony, not documents, and even the testimony could be used in 
hearings on objections to discharge.  United States v. Seiffert, 501 F.2d 974, 981 (5th 
Cir. 1974) (“Nor does that immunity extend, as the appellant would have it, to 
certain of his books and records introduced in evidence against him at trial.”); 11 
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immunity.275  The Act was the immediate predecessor to the modern-
day Code and required the debtor to testify in all circumstances.276  
The debtor’s refusal to answer any material question could result in 
the denial of the debtor’s discharge.277  The debtor was expected to 
be forthcoming even on incriminating matters because the Act 
granted use immunity automatically.278 
The Court has altered the type of immunity necessary to compel 
testimony in the face of a proper assertion of the privilege.  The 
Court has moved from a rule, mandating transactional immunity in 
exchange for “immunized testimony”279 to a rule that permits the 
compulsion of privileged testimony through use immunity and 
derivative use immunity.280  Debtors, debtors’ counsel, and the courts 
have been affected in dramatically different ways by the Court’s 
decisions and the exceptions to the exercise of the privilege that 
allow compulsion of incriminating documents after assertion of the 
privilege without a grant of immunity.281 
 
U.S.C. 25(a)(10) (repealed 1978) (“[N]o testimony, or any evidence which is directly 
or indirectly derived from such testimony, given by him shall be offered in evidence 
against him in any criminal proceeding, except such testimony as may be given by him in 
the hearing upon objections to his discharge. . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 275  In re Rosser, 96 F. 305 (E.D. Mo. 1899) (finding that refusal was allowed where 
debtor refused to answer certain questions before a referee on the ground of self-
incrimination, despite the fact that § 7 of the Bankruptcy Act gave use immunity to 
the debtor). 
 276  11 USC § 25(a)(10) (repealed 1978) (finding that a debtor is required to 
testify in all circumstances). 
 277  11 USC § 32(c)(6) (repealed 1978) (finding that refusal to answer a material 
question was grounds for a denial of a discharge). 
 278  11 USC § 25(a)(10) (repealed 1978) (discussing statutory grant of use 
immunity). 
 279  Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 585–86 (1892). 
 280  Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 462 (1972). 
 281  Compulsion of the production of incriminating documents has been allowed 
after proper assertion of the privilege and without a grant of immunity thus creating 
exceptions to the exercise of the privilege under various theories including a 
corporate records exception, public records exception, a required records 
exception, and an exception based on the assumption of custodial duties under a 
required regulatory regime.  See Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 380 (1911) 
(finding that if corporate papers are records of an organization or “collective entity” 
with a duty to keep records, no Fifth Amendment privilege attached); In re Grand 
Jury Proceedings, 119 B.R. 945, 949–50 n.4 (E.D. Mich. 1990) (finding that 
documents that Chapter 7 trustee had to maintain in his official capacity as trustee of 
bankruptcy estate qualified as “public records,” which trustee could be required to 
produce under public records exception to Fifth Amendment); In re Grand Jury 
Subpoena Duces Tecum Served Upon Underhill, 781 F.2d 64, 67(6th Cir. 1986); 
Balt. City Dept. of Social Servs v. Bouknight, 493 U.S. 549, 555 (1990) (finding that a 
person may not claim the Amendment’s protections based upon the incrimination 
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1.  Procedure for the Grant of Immunity 
Under Part V of Title 18,282 whenever a witness refuses to testify 
in a court proceeding based on her privilege against self-
incrimination, an Assistant United States Attorney must first seek the 
U.S. Attorney’s permission to refer the matter to an Assistant 
Attorney General (AAG), and then must obtain the approval of the 
AAG for the Criminal Division or the AAG for the division of the 
Department of Justice accountable for the case.283  If an AAG other 
than the AAG for the Criminal Division approves the request, the 
approval of the AAG for the Criminal Division is also necessary.284  An 
Assistant U.S. Attorney may then file the necessary motion in the 
District Court requesting an order granting the debtor immunity 
related to that testimony.285 
If use and derivative use immunity are granted, the debtor may 
not lawfully refuse to testify to those issues.286  However, no testimony 
or other information compelled under the order, or any information 
directly or indirectly derived from such testimony or information may 
be used against the debtor in any criminal case, except for 
prosecution for perjury, giving a false statement, or otherwise failing 
to comply with the order.287  The protection that the grant of use and 
derivative use immunity affords the debtor from exposure to criminal 
liability is beneficial but problematic. 
  As noted above, use and derivative use immunity combined do 
not provide the debtor the same level of protection as transactional 
immunity and leave the debtor open to criminal sanctions based on 
 
that may result from the “unadorned act of producing the child” or the “contents or 
nature of the thing demanded”). 
 282  18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6005 (2006). 
 283  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEY’S MANUAL § 9-23. 110-310 (1992).  As an 
alternative, informal or “hip pocket” immunity may be granted.  The debtor should 
still be cautious of this form of immunity as it arises from no statutory provision, is 
discretionary with the prosecutor, and is not binding on any other jurisdiction.  
Courts have frowned upon the practice, but have accepted it as the promise not to 
prosecute is of value.  United States v. Anderson, 778 F.2d 602, 606 (10th Cir. 1985) 
(“The propriety of using informal immunity has been frequently upheld.”); United 
States v. Winter, 663 F.2d 1120, 1133 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1011 
(1983); United States v. Librach, 536 F.2d 1228, 1230 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 
U.S. 939 (1976); see also United States v. Peister, 631 F.2d 658, 662–63 (10th 
Cir.1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1126 (1981).”). 
 284  U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEY’S MANUAL § 9-23.130 (1992). 
 285  18 U.S.C. §§ 6002–6003 (2006); see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, U.S. ATTORNEY’S 
MANUAL § 9-23,310 (1992). 
 286  18 U.S.C. § 6002 (2006). 
 287  Id. 
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evidence unrelated to her testimony.  In addition, the grant of 
immunity does not prevent the use of the debtor’s testimony to prove 
elements of a crime in the bankruptcy proceeding as a basis for 
denial of discharge.288  In short, the grant of use and derivative use 
immunity in bankruptcy proceedings may lessen the possibility of 
bringing criminal charges, but it does not fully protect the debtor 
from criminal punishment, civil liability, or a denial of discharge. 
Considering the disadvantages the debtor faces if she testifies 
after the court issues a grant of immunity, the debtor might still be 
tempted to refuse to testify.  That also is problematic.  The debtor’s 
refusal to testify after a grant of use and derivative use immunity is 
grounds for a global objection to discharge and a basis for the court’s 
denial of discharge.289  In addition, the debtor’s refusal to testify after 
a grant of immunity may subject her to contempt proceedings and 
sanctions including fines and imprisonment.290  In other words, 
whether the debtor testifies after a grant of use and derivative use 
immunity, or whether the debtor refuses to testify after a grant of use 
immunity, the debtor risks going to jail and a denial of discharge.291  
What may seem a Hobson’s Choice292 is, for the truly innocent debtor, 
more akin to Sophie’s Choice,293 and commentators explored this but 
Congress and the courts largely ignore or accept it.294 
If the United States Attorney does not request immunity for the 
debtor, or if immunity is not offered, then the debtor may refuse to 
testify, invoking her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
 
 288  In re Leslie, 119 F. 406, 409 (N.D.N.Y. 1903). 
 289  11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(6) (2012). 
 290  In re Martin-Trigona, 732 F.2d 170 (2d Cir. 1984). 
 291  See Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 496 (1967) (holding that in a 
prosecution for conspiracy to obstruct justice a choice between self-incrimination 
and job forfeiture was coercion that violated the privilege against self-incrimination). 
 292  A Hobson’s Choice is a free choice with only one option offered. 
 293  The term Sophie’s Choice, after the novel and film of the same name, refers 
to a choice between two unbearable options.  Sophie’s Choice was undeniably more 
horrific than the scenario posed here for Sophie Debtor. 
 294  Craig P. Gaumer & Charles L. Nail, Jr., Truth of Consequences: The Dilemma of 
Asserting the Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Bankruptcy Proceedings, 
76 NEB. L. REV. 497, 559–60 (1997); Laurie K. Jones, Bankruptcy Courts and the 
Reluctant Witness: Why A Rule 26(c) Protective Order Is Not A Substitute for A Grant of 
Immunity When the Witness Refuses to Testify Based Upon Fear of Criminal Prosecution, 25 
CAL. BANKR. J. 180, 182 (2000); Allan B. Diamond & Erin E. Jones, Avoiding Litigation 
Pitfalls: An Introduction to the Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in 
Bankruptcy Proceedings, AM. BANKR. INST. J., 20, 66 (2008); Leonard M. Shulman & 
Kara Germane, A Debtor’s Right to Silence in A Bankruptcy Proceeding, ORANGE COUNTY 
LAW., 46, 47 (2005). 
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incrimination, and retain her right to a discharge.295  A debtor may 
invoke her right in response to incriminating questions both during 
discovery and at trial.296  As noted earlier, current bankruptcy law 
under the Code specifically provides for the preservation of the 
privilege; though unlike the previous Act, the grant of immunity is 
not automatic.297 
2.  Practical Considerations 
The statistical probability of an offer of immunity is small.298  It is 
unlikely that a request for immunity by the trustee or the United 
States Attorney will be made, and any request may be denied by the 
Assistant U.S. Attorney General or the district court.  Often there is a 
sense that a successful objection to discharge can be accomplished 
without the testimonial information that a grant of immunity would 
compel.  Likewise, a United States Attorney may prefer to prosecute 
with the available evidence rather than suffer the proof burden of 
establishing that the state’s case is not comprised of the debtor’s 
testimony or any fruits (evidence) derived from that testimony. 
V.  THE FORM OF REFORM TO PROTECT THE PRIVILEGE 
A. Revision of Official Form B201A Notice to Individual Debtors 
The pro se debtor and the debtor with counsel need notice of 
the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.  All debtors 
should be advised of the existence of the privilege and should be 
given some sense of its scope and its limitations.  Pre-filing disclosures 
relevant to invocation and waiver and the potential consequences of 
each would serve the purposes of the rules of bankruptcy procedure 
and promote the ends of justice.299  Some may seize on this proposal 
as a Miranda warning for the debtor and argue it exceeds the 
mandate of Miranda because the proceedings are not custodial or 
 
 295  In re Hulon, 92 B.R. 670, 673 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1988); In re Girdaukas, 92 B.R. 
373, 376 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1988); In re Connelly, 59 B.R. 421, 426  & 430 (Bankr. 
N.D. Ill. 1986); Chrysler Capital Corp. v. Salzman (In re Salzman), 61 B.R. 878, 889 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986); Turner v. Wlodarski (In re Minton Group, Inc.), 43 B.R. 705, 
709 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984). 
 296  Grand Jury Proceedings (Williams), 995 F.2d 1013, 1018 n.11 (11th Cir. 1993). 
 297  11 U.S.C. § 344 (2006). 
 298  This assertion is based on the Author’s observations as a deputy prosecuting 
attorney, bankruptcy trustee, judge, and practitioner for over 36 years and 
conversations with trustees and government attorneys. 
 299  See generally, FED. R. BANKR. P. 1001. 
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criminal.  Aside from the fact that the proceedings may be 
custodial,300 the Author’s thesis is not that Miranda should apply even 
in a noncustodial setting.  The Author’s thesis is that the privilege 
exists as a constitutional right in bankruptcy, and that it has value and 
utility to debtors.  Therefore, as a matter of adjudicative policy, the 
Court should compel disclosure of the right to claim the privilege. 
To accomplish this result, a new proposal for an Official Form 
should be promulgated by the Judicial Conference of the United 
States pursuant to its authority under the Federal Rules of 
Bankruptcy Procedure (hereinafter “the Rules”) Rule 9009.  In the 
interim, the Director of the Administrative Office of the United 
States Courts should issue additional forms for use under the Code 
pursuant to Rule 9009 of the Rules.301  The proposed form should be 
construed to be consistent with the rules and the Code and secure 
the “just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every case and 
proceeding.”302 
1.  The Status Quo 
Current law mandates that the Official Forms offer several 
notices and warnings to the consumer debtor.  The first notice 
requires disclosure of the opportunities for credit counseling, budget 
analysis, and instruction on financial management.303  The second 
notice advises the consumer debtor of the four chapters of the 
Bankruptcy Code that may be available as filing options and briefly 
outlines the nature of each chapter.304  In the third numbered 
paragraph of the Official Form, the debtor is warned that there are 
criminal penalties for the fraudulent concealment of assets, perjury 
and false swearing, which include fines, imprisonment, or both.305 
This notice regarding criminal conduct and penalties is 
 
 300  See supra Part III.D.4 
 301  The current Director is Judge Thomas F. Hogan. Judge Hogan is the chief 
administrative officer for the federal courts and secretary to the Judicial Conference 
of the United States. For information on the Administrative Office of the United 
States Courts. See UNITED STATES COURTS, Bankruptcy Courts, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/UnderstandingtheFederalCourts/Bankrupt
cyCourts.aspx.   
 302  FED. R. BANKR. P. 1001. 
 303  11 U.S.C. § 342(b) (2012), FED. R. BANKR. P. 9009; see Official Form B201A, 
available at http://bankrupt.com/misc/canb10-71819.pdf.  
 304  11 U.S.C. § 342(b) (2012), Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9009; see Official Form B201A, 
available at http://bankrupt.com/misc/canb10-71819.pdf. 
 305  11 U.S.C. § 342(b) (2012), Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9009; see Official Form B201A, 
available at http://bankrupt.com/misc/canb10-71819.pdf. 
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immediately followed by the disclosure that “[a]ll information 
supplied by a debtor . . . is subject to examination by. . .the 
Department of Justice.”306  Finally, in a section labeled “WARNING,” 
Official Form B201A concludes by disclosing that Section 521(a)(1) 
of the Code requires the debtor to promptly file detailed information 
regarding creditors, assets, liabilities, income, expenses, and her 
general financial condition.  This paragraph warns the debtor that 
her bankruptcy case may be dismissed if this information is not filed 
with the court within the time deadlines set by the Code, Rules, and 
local rules.  The debtor is directed to a website address for Official 
Form B200 which provides a listing of the documents and 
deadlines.307 
The debtor’s attorney must certify delivery of the required 
notices and the debtor must affirm that she has received and read the 
notices.308  The requirement of these and other notices to the debtor 
by Congress and the Court make clear the importance current law 
places on the disclosure to the debtor of the opportunities to avoid 
bankruptcy, potential bankruptcy filing options, the possibilities for 
criminal exposure, criminal penalties, the availability of documents 
for inspection by the DOJ, the requirements for disclosure, and risk 
of dismissal.309  It seems illogical, given the present breadth and depth 
in the level of specificity of notices to the debtor, that the Code, Rules 
and Official Forms are strangely silent regarding the debtor’s 
privilege against self-incrimination.  This is particularly true in light 
of the evidentiary value of the privilege and its relative importance 
when compared to the notices pertaining to statutory rights and 
criminal penalties. 
2.  A Modest Proposal for Change 
As a policy matter, the notion that each of these mandated 
notices and warnings are more critical to the consumer debtor than 
the disclosure of the privilege is untenable.  Although disclosure of 
the existence of the privilege is not required under current law, there 
is no prohibition of notice.  When consideration is given to the 
 
 306  11 U.S.C. § 342(b) (2012), Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9009; see Official Form B201A, 
available at http://bankrupt.com/misc/canb10-71819.pdf. 
 307  11 U.S.C. § 342(b) (2012), Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9009; see Official Form B201A, 
available at http://bankrupt.com/misc/canb10-71819.pdf. 
 308  11 U.S.C. § 342(b) (2012); FED. R. BANKR. P. 9009; see Official Form B201B, 
available at http://bankrupt.com/misc/canb10-71819.pdf. 
 309  11 U.S.C. § 342(b) (2012); FED. R. BANKR. P. 9009; see also Official Form B201A, 
available at http://bankrupt.com/misc/canb10-71819.pdf. 
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constitutional origins and evidentiary value of the privilege, 
particularly to the pro se debtor, the absence of notice is alarming 
and difficult to understand.310  Although traditionally in bankruptcy 
pro se litigants are assumed to be less educated than debtors who are 
represented, the opposite is true.  The pro se debtor is also more 
educated than the general pro se population.311  The higher level of 
education, coupled with the publication and availability of the official 
forms, engenders hubris in the consumer debtor.  The resulting 
overconfidence, when combined with the easy availability of the 
forms, tempts the pro se debtor to file a complex federal proceeding 
that is beyond the debtor’s expertise.312  As a consequence, the pro se 
debtor often discovers belatedly that the filing was ill advised and will 
be dismissed or have unintended results.  The proof of this 
phenomenon can be seen in the relative success rates between pro se 
and represented filers in obtaining a discharge.313  Pro se filers are ten 
times less likely to obtain a discharge.314 
A procedure for disclosure of the right to the privilege currently 
 
 310  Studies show the demographics for pro se debtors in state courts include a 
higher incidence among the young, the poor, the less educated, women and 
minorities.  Ayn Crawley, Trends in Pro Se Litigation, MD. LEGAL ASSISTANCE NETWORK, 
http://www.courts.ca.gov/partners/documents/HelpThemselves.pdf (last visited 
Aug. 16, 2013) (reporting that statewide statistics of over 40,000 self-represented 
users of programs in Maryland in 2002 indicated that 60% were women; 44% 
described themselves as African American and 9% as Hispanic; the vast majority had 
modest incomes); see also Connie J.A. Beck et al.,  Divorce Mediation With and Without 
Legal Representation: A Focus on Intimate Partner Violence and Abuse, FAMILY COURT REV., 
48(4): 631–645, Oct 2010, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1744-
1617.2010.01338.x/pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 2013); see also Chanley S. Painter, 
Exploring the Problem of Self-Represented Litigants in Arkansas Civil Courts, Arkansas Access 
to Justice Commission in partnership with the Clinton School of Public Service 
(2011) http://www.arkansasjustice.org/sites/default/files/file%20attachments
/Capstone%20Report%20-%20AAJC%20Final.pdf (last visited Aug. 16, 2013). 
 311  ANGELA LITTWIN, BROKE: HOW DEBT BANKRUPTS THE MIDDLE CLASS 157–58 
(Katherine Porter ed., 2012). Results based on the 2007 Consumer Bankruptcy 
Project; see Joseph Callanan, Pro Se Bankruptcy Filings Growing Faster than Other Debtor 
Relief, LITIGATION NEWS (Dec. 29, 2011),  http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation
/litigationnews/top_stories/010312-pro-se-bankruptcy-growing.html (offering 
explanations of the differences in education level between pro se debtors and other 
pro se litigants). 
 312  Joseph Callanan, Pro Se Bankruptcy Filings Growing Faster than Other Debtor Relief, 
LITIGATION NEWS (Dec. 29, 2011), http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation
/litigationnews/top_stories/010312-pro-se-bankruptcy-growing.html (offering 
explanations of the differences in education level between pro se debtors and other 
pro se litigants). 
 313  Id. 
 314  Id. 
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exists, albeit in the context of another federal civil proceeding.315  For 
more than two decades, the federal administrative rules have been 
used to mandate that notice of the privilege be given by the 
Department of Justice to respondents in proceedings to assess civil 
penalties for possession of small amounts of certain controlled 
substances.316  Thus, there is a precedent, a form, and a format in use 
by federal authorities in civil proceedings that provide a template for 
the construction of a similar notice in the bankruptcy context.317  The 
adoption of the wording presently in use could easily be adapted to 
provide a new category for the proposed revision of Official Form 
B201A to read as follows: 
4.  Notice to the individual consumer debtor of the right to 
invoke privileges, including the privilege against self-
incrimination: Any statement given during the course of 
any proceedings or any documents filed in the proceedings 
may be used against the person in this or any other 
proceeding, including any criminal prosecution.  Each 
individual debtor may be able to assert a privilege, such as 
the privilege against self-incrimination.  Any petition, 
schedule, statement, or pleading required to be filed or 
contested by the debtor in a responsive pleading shall 
include a statement that the respondent admits, denies, 
does not have and is unable to obtain sufficient information 
to admit or deny each allegation, or that an answer to the 
allegation is protected by a privilege, including the privilege 
against self-incrimination.  A statement of lack of information 
or a statement that the answer to the allegation is privileged 
shall have the effect of a denial. 
This simple proposal for an addition to a revised Official Form 
B201A will go far in eliminating the dangers that presently lurk for 
the uninformed debtor.  Whether the individual is an uneducated 
pro se debtor or a represented debtor whose attorney has neglected 
to inform her of her rights, the harm is the same.  No debtor should 
be denied her Fifth Amendment right to the privilege against self-
 
 315  21 U.S.C. § 844(a) (2006); 28 C.F.R. § 76.4 (b)(2) (2007) (stating that the 
Notice of Intent to Assess a Civil Penalty will advise the respondent that any 
statement given may be used against the person in any proceeding, including 
criminal prosecution and that the respondent may be able to assert a privilege such 
as the privilege against self-incrimination). 
 316  21 U.S.C. § 844(a) (2006). 
 317  Id.; 28 C.F.R. 76.9(c)(2)–(3) (2007) (providing that the content of any answer 
filed by a respondent may contain a statement that an answer to the allegation is 
protected by a privilege, including the privilege against self-incrimination, and that 
such a statement shall have the effect of a denial). 
TARVIN (DO NOT DELETE) 1/10/2014  3:44 PM 
100 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:47 
 
incrimination due to personal ignorance or professional neglect. 
The Court, under its inherent authority and pursuant to federal 
law,318 should adopt a revised Official Form B201A to provide notice 
of the debtor’s privilege against self-incrimination as numbered 
paragraph 4 of the current form.  The form should be promulgated 
by the Judicial Conference of the United States pursuant to its 
authority under Rule 9009 of the Rules.319  The revised form would 
help to insure that the debtor is aware of the privilege prior to filing.  
In the interim, the Director of the Administrative Office of the U.S. 
Courts should issue the revised form for use under the Code.320  The 
Court’s action is necessary to afford the debtor, who appears before 
the DOJ trustee in bankruptcy, the same notice that is currently 
provided to a civil litigant who is targeted by the DOJ for an 
assessment of civil penalties for possession of certain controlled 
substances.321 
B.  The Rulemaking Process 
Proposed amendments to the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy are 
handled by a time-proven and statutorily sanctioned process.322  The 
process is the same for proposed amendments to the Federal Rules of 
Appellate, Civil, and Criminal Procedure, and the Federal Rules of 
Evidence.323 There are seven steps in the process of amending the 
bankruptcy forms. The first step in the process is the initial 
consideration by the Advisory Committee.324  The publication and 
public comment period is next, followed by consideration of the 
public comments and final approval by the Advisory Committee.  The 
fourth step is the approval by the Standing Committee, followed by 
Judicial Conference Approval.  Next, the United States Supreme 
 
 318  28 U.S.C. § 2075 (2006). 
 319  FED. R. BANKR. P. 9009. 
 320  Id.  
 321  See 11 U.S.C. § 342 (2006); In re Litton, 74 B.R. 557, 560 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 
1987). 
 322  Rules Enabling Act 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–2077 (2006), available at, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/rules/about-rulemaking 
/how-rulemaking-process-works/overview-bench-bar-public.aspx. 
 323  UNITED STATES COURTS, Federal Rules of Practice and Procedure, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/rules/about-rulemaking 
/how-rulemaking-process-works.aspx (last visited Aug. 16, 2013). 
 324  UNITED STATES COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies
/rules/Members_List_Oct_2011.pdf (last visited Aug. 16, 2013) (listing the 
composition of the Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules and contact 
information). 
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Court must give its approval, and finally there must be Congressional 
Review and the implementation of the rules.325 
As of the date of this publication, there are no completed rules 
or pending rules that address the issues surrounding the provision of 
notice to individual debtors of their Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination.326  All of those involved in the rulemaking 
process have a tremendous responsibility.  Debtors and lawyers, no 
less than other citizens, are beneficiaries of the Court’s efforts to 
preserve and protect the rights of all parties in our system of justice.  
That effort includes the preservation and protection of the rights of 
debtors and the institutionalization of principles of fundamental 
fairness in the bankruptcy courts. 
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The adverse consequences for even one truly innocent debtor, 
however seemingly guilty, are disproportionately harsh.  The 
protection of the privilege for the factually guilty is equally important 
and its loss, equally harsh.  This is particularly true when the 
protection of every debtor from the inadvertent loss of the privilege 
can be so easily accomplished.  The current system perpetuates 
nondisclosure and allows the unrepresented, uneducated debtor to 
be victimized by her own ignorance or the inadvertence of counsel.  
In both instances, the integrity and respectability of our system of 
justice are needlessly impugned. 
The cost of adding a disclosure to the debtor regarding her Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination means revising a 
mass produced form to include a fourth paragraph on the lower half 
of the second page in an otherwise blank space.  This would be a 
minimally burdensome measure that would go far in preserving one 
of our most fundamental constitutional rights.  The preservation of 
 
 325  One may argue that any change in Official Form B201A must be preceded by a 
statutory amendment to 11 U.S.C. § 342(b) because that provision is the statutory 
authority for the publication of the notices contained in B201A. The Author 
concedes that the argument is not without merit, and that statutory amendment is 
desirable; however, the disclosure of the privilege included in the DOJ notice was 
authorized by administrative rule without the necessity of Congressional action. The 
counterargument is that because the privilege originates in the Constitution, no 
statutory authority is needed for the Court to make that fact known as a matter of 
adjudicatory policy through its rulemaking authority.  
 326 Pending Rules Amendments, UNITED STATES COURTS, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/rulesandpolicies/rules/pending-rules.aspx (last visited 
Aug. 16, 2013). 
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that right and its value to an innocent debtor, however seemingly 
guilty, is immeasurable.  The value to the factually guilty is critical as 
well. 
Only when the innocent debtor who is seemingly guilty receives 
notice of her constitutional right to the evidentiary privilege against 
self-incrimination will the rules in bankruptcy proceedings, “secure 
the just . . . determination of every case and proceeding.”  Only then 
will the privilege take its rightful place alongside bankruptcy’s 
mandated notices regarding the availability of credit counseling 
services, bankruptcy chapter filing options, bankruptcy crimes, and 
the availability of bankruptcy papers to law enforcement officials.  
Until that time pro se debtors and debtors with counsel will remain 
vulnerable to the loss of the privilege in criminal proceedings 
because of nondisclosure.  The existing form highlights the 
opportunity for law enforcement review, investigation, and 
prosecution of all documents and related matters.327  Without notice, 
debtors will face the loss of a privilege scrupulously preserved and 
guarded throughout our history in the protection of the 
constitutional rights of even the worst criminals. 
The debtor, who may be among our poorest citizens, should not 
discover in the course of her bankruptcy that she has unwittingly 
forfeited one of her fundamental constitutional rights.328  To avoid 
this result, Official Form B201A should be revised in a simple, 
straightforward way by providing notice of the privilege to all 
individual debtors prior to the time of filing. 
A revision of Official Form B201A to include notice of the 
privilege will benefit the attorneys who represent debtors as well.  
History reveals how fluid the privilege and the law surrounding it can 
be.329  The privilege, like the law itself, is a moving stream with waters 
that rise and recede and sometimes overflow the banks to course 
where they will.  Skilled counsel, like experienced boatmen, do well 
to observe the weather before braving the currents with those 
entrusted to their care. 
 
 327  11 U.S.C. § 342(b) (2006); FED. R. BANKR. P. 9009; Official Form B201A, 
available at http://bankrupt.com/misc/canb10-71819.pdf.   
 328  Total consumer (nonbusiness) filings for the 12-month period ending March 
31, 2012, were 1,320,613, comprising 97% of all bankruptcy filings.  See Table F-2, 
U.S. Bankruptcy Courts—Business and Nonbusiness Cases Commenced, by Chapter of the 
Bankruptcy Code, UNITED STATES COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts
/Statistics/BankruptcyStatistics/BankruptcyFilings/2012/0312_f2.pdf (last visited 
Oct. 7, 2013). 
 329  See supra Part I.E. 
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APPENDIX A 
Trustee: Do you solemnly swear or affirm to tell the whole truth? 
Sophie: I do. 
Trustee: Please state your name and address for the record. 
Sophie: My name is Sophie Debtor and I’m from Hard Luck  
Town. 
Trustee: Did you read your voluntary petition and schedules? 
Sophie: Yes. 
Trustee: Does it include all your property? 
Sophie: Yes. 
Trustee: Have you listed all of your debts? 
Sophie: No.  I recently discovered a credit card bill. 
Trustee: What’s the bill for? 
Sophie: Cash advances and jewelry. 
Trustee: When were these transactions? 
Sophie: Within the past 60 days. 
Trustee: How much were they? 
Sophie: The advance was $1000 and the jewelry was also $1000. 
Trustee: Do you have the cash or the jewelry? 
Sophie: No. 
Trustee: What did you do with these items? 
Sophie: My husband gave them to someone without my 
permission. 
Trustee: Who was it? 
Sophie: Corrie Delecti. 
Trustee: Where are they now? 
Sophie:(Fidgeting and awkward silence).  Corrie Delecti’s 
apartment in Hard Luck Town. 
Trustee: Is that the woman who was recently murdered? 
Sophie: Yes.330 
Trustee: How do you know the cash advances and jewelry are 
there? 
Sophie: My estranged husband told me. 
 
 330  At this point, a judge might have objected on behalf of the debtor and advised 
her that she had the right to remain silent.  Unfortunately for Sophie, trustees have 
wider latitude of questioning in a creditor’s meeting because the court cannot be 
present.  11 U.S.C. § 341(c) (2006). 
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Trustee: So, have you been to the apartment and seen the items? 
Sophie: Well, I’ve been to the apartment complex, but I did not 
go into her apartment. 
Trustee: When was this? 
Sophie: The night that she was killed. 
Trustee: So you were in the apartment complex of your 
husband’s mistress on the night that she was murdered, but you 
didn’t go into her apartment?  Not even to ask her to give back 
the jewelry that he had supposedly given to her? 
Sophie: No. I was there to see another friend. I did see Ms. 
Delecti and speak to her, but I did not inquire about the items 
because I did not know the woman with whom I spoke was Ms. 
Delecti at that time.  I only realized after I saw the news reports 
of her murder. Ms. Delecti was my friend’s neighbor. 
Trustee: Can this friend verify that you did not go in to Corrie 
Delecti’s apartment? 
Sophie: Well, no.  My friend wasn’t home that night. I just 
dropped by and she did not know that I was coming over. 
Trustee: So you are asking me to believe that the cash and 
jewelry were purchased without your knowledge or permission, 
given to the murdered mistress of your husband, and that you 
went to her apartment the night of her murder and neither went 
into her apartment nor asked her about these items.  Is that 
right? 
Sophie: Yes.  That’s the truth.  I swear. 
Trustee: Have you amended your schedule to reflect these 
transactions? 
Sophie: No. 
Trustee: Will you do so? 
Sophie: Yes. 
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APPENDIX B 
Trustee: Do you solemnly swear or affirm to tell the whole truth? 
Sophie: I do. 
Trustee: Please state your name for the record. 
Sophie: My name is Sophie Debtor and I’m from Hard Luck 
Town. 
Trustee: Did you read your voluntary petition and schedules? 
Sophie: Yes. 
Trustee: Does it include all your property? 
Sophie: Yes. 
Trustee: Have you listed all of your debts? 
Sophie/Counsel:  I (my client) respectfully wish(es) to 
unambiguously invoke my (her) right to the privilege against 
self-incrimination on the grounds that my (her) response may 
incriminate me (her). 
 
